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Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Econometrica, 1999The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two ...
Jean Tirole
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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
Metroeconomica, 2008ABSTRACTContractual incompleteness has been understood in the literature as the conditions under which contracts are insufficiently state contingent due to non‐observable and/or non‐verifiable states of the world. The term incomplete contracts has been used in different meanings: to denote both proper contractual incompleteness (in a complete contracts
Basile, Liliana, Trani, Raffaele
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Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs [PDF]
Theory and Decision, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Anderlini L., Felli L.
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An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
The Review of Economic Studies, 1992We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
Aghion, Philippe, Bolton, Patrick
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Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Review of Economic Studies, 1999zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean
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Incomplete contracts versus communication
Journal of Economic Theory, 2022zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Andreas Blume, Inga Deimen, Sean Inoue
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Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts
The RAND Journal of Economics, 1992I examine the welfare effects associated with having agents write incomplete contracts. When contracting parties are permitted to renegotiate existing contracts, I show that they will be able to design contracts that can implement the set of first-best allocations via renegotiation.
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2002
Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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2018
Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Incomplete Contracts, Risk, and Ownership
International Economic Review, 1995This paper develops a model of ownership based on incomplete contracts, specific investments, and risk and tests the model using data on industrial subcontracting in Mexico. The choice of ownership structure involves a trade-off between minimizing holdup risk and spreading natural risk.
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