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Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation [PDF]
Econometrica, 1988 When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable for the parties to specify all the relevant contingencies. In particular, they may be unable to describe the states of the world in enough detail that an outsider (the courts) could later verify which state had occurred, and so the contract will be incomplete.
Hardman Moore, John, Hart, Oliver
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Foundations of Incomplete Contracts [PDF]
Review of Economic Studies, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Oliver Hart, John Moore
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The Impact of Foundations of Contract on Essential Conditions for Validity of a Contract [PDF]
پژوهشنامه حقوق اسلامی, 2016 The foundation of the contract have a considerable effect on the interpretation of theconditions of the validity of contract, their position in the contract and theirimpression in the iranian law .This research surveys the impacts of the ...
Mozhde Abooie, mehdi Shahabi
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International Journal of Applied Research in Business and Management, 2022 Outsourcing is a phenomenon regularly explored through two theories: transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory. The second approach is frequently seen as an extension of the first but is it right to do so?
Quentin Commine
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Nonprofit Policy Forum, 2019 This paper examines the use of the nonprofit organizational form to mitigate the impact of incomplete contracts in the public sector Transaction costs economics (TCE) predicts that the expense of incomplete contracts will rise with contract complexity ...
Thornton Jeremy, Lecy Jesse
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A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory
Games, 2017 This article provides a brief overview of the Property-Rights Theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and situates the theory in other literatures.
Richard Holden
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A BAYESIAN GAME FOR A PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING CONTRACT
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, 2021 This paper presents a Bayesian game model for a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract. We develop the model in two parts, one for a non-social bank and the other for a social bank.
Djaffar Lessy +2 more
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Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2016 This paper studies how changes in bargaining power alter the surplus distribution and sustainability of incomplete agricultural contracts. When an enforceable payment exists, self-enforcement is always sustainable, the highest quality is traded, and any ...
Salas Paula Cordero
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When Penalty Fails: Modeling Contractual Misincentives With Evidence From Portugal ITO Agreements
SAGE Open, 2022 A misincentive is characterized as an incentive producing the opposite effect of motivating or preventing some specific action. In some circumstances, contract penalties such as sanctions and fines on late delivery or low-quality software encourage the ...
Thyago Celso Cavalcante Nepomuceno +4 more
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IT Outsourcing Auctions With Bilateral Efforts and Renegotiation
IEEE Access, 2019 In information technology outsourcing (ITO), contracts are often awarded through reverse auctions, and renegotiations usually take place for contract amendment after the transaction parties exert joint efforts in project quality improvement.
Zhipeng Li, Jianyun Chen
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