Results 11 to 20 of about 270,006 (285)
Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts [PDF]
Research in Economics, 2004 This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behavior and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they write must be algorithmic in nature. We start with a definition of contract incompleteness that seems both ap- pealing and widely applicable.
Anderlini L., Felli L.
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International outsourcing and incomplete contracts [PDF]
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2005 Abstract. International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production.
Barbara J. Spencer
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Cognition and Incomplete Contracts [PDF]
American Economic Review, 2009 Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)
Tirole, Jean
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Nonprofit Policy Forum, 2019 This paper examines the use of the nonprofit organizational form to mitigate the impact of incomplete contracts in the public sector Transaction costs economics (TCE) predicts that the expense of incomplete contracts will rise with contract complexity ...
Thornton Jeremy, Lecy Jesse
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A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory
Games, 2017 This article provides a brief overview of the Property-Rights Theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and situates the theory in other literatures.
Richard Holden
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A BAYESIAN GAME FOR A PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING CONTRACT
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, 2021 This paper presents a Bayesian game model for a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract. We develop the model in two parts, one for a non-social bank and the other for a social bank.
Djaffar Lessy +2 more
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Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2016 This paper studies how changes in bargaining power alter the surplus distribution and sustainability of incomplete agricultural contracts. When an enforceable payment exists, self-enforcement is always sustainable, the highest quality is traded, and any ...
Salas Paula Cordero
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When Penalty Fails: Modeling Contractual Misincentives With Evidence From Portugal ITO Agreements
SAGE Open, 2022 A misincentive is characterized as an incentive producing the opposite effect of motivating or preventing some specific action. In some circumstances, contract penalties such as sanctions and fines on late delivery or low-quality software encourage the ...
Thyago Celso Cavalcante Nepomuceno +4 more
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IT Outsourcing Auctions With Bilateral Efforts and Renegotiation
IEEE Access, 2019 In information technology outsourcing (ITO), contracts are often awarded through reverse auctions, and renegotiations usually take place for contract amendment after the transaction parties exert joint efforts in project quality improvement.
Zhipeng Li, Jianyun Chen
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Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019 We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness comes without a cost.
Gretschko, Vitali, Pollrich, Martin
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