Results 1 to 10 of about 23,407,561 (253)
Journal of the Medical Library Association, 2021 Objective: The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the public’s need for quality health information that is understandable. This study aimed to identify (1) the extent to which COVID-19 messaging by state public health departments is understandable, actionable,
Nandita S. Mani +3 more
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Journal of Political Economy, 2023 A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information-disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define interim-optimal mechanisms, a subset of incentive-compatible mechanisms that are optimal in the sense that the informed designer cannot credibly find an alternative mechanism that ...
Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Vasiliki
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Interactive Information Design [PDF]
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2018 We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame-perfect equilibria.
Koessler, Frédéric +2 more
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Immersive Unit Visualization with Augmented Reality
Multimodal Technologies and Interaction, 2023 Immersive Unit Visualization is an emergent form of visualization that arose from Immersive Analytics where, unlike traditional visualizations, each data point is represented by an individual visual mark in an immersive virtual environment. This practice
Ana Beatriz Marques +3 more
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Designing Informative Securities [PDF]
CoRR, 2012 Engineering and Applied ...
Yiling Chen +2 more
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Information Design for Multiple Interdependent Defenders: Work Less, Pay Off More
Games, 2023 This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker.
Chenghan Zhou +3 more
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Dynamic Information Design [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020 We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this signal, the receiver takes an action that determines rewards for both the sender and the receiver and controls the ...
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Theoretical Economics, 2022 We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information.
Koessler, Frédéric +3 more
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Information informing design:
Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 2020 AbstractThis debut curated “virtual special issue” of JASIST is on the theme of “information informing design.” It comprises several excellent scholarly research articles previously published in JASIST with important implications for the design of digital information environments.
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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019 A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments.
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