Results 1 to 10 of about 622 (124)
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials [PDF]
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2022 This is a camera-ready version of the 17th conference on web and internet economics (WINE 2021)
Vijay G Subramanian +2 more
exaly +3 more sources
Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2021 AbstractOriginating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single ...
Makoto Shimoji
exaly +5 more sources
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We take a robust (adversarial) approach to study this problem; that is, our goal is to design signaling schemes for ...
Yakov Babichenko +3 more
openaire +3 more sources
PENDEKATAN REGRESI LOGISTIK BAYES PADA PEMODELAN PERILAKU IBU TERHADAP KEBERSIHAN MULUT ANAK BALITA
E-Jurnal Matematika, 2022 Human behavior is a set of behaviors that humans have that are influenced by customs, value, ethics, attitudes, emotion, power, persuasion, and/or genetics. Oral hygiene is a form of dental hygiene. Toddler often suffer from oral and dental problems such
KASTIN DWILEN PONG SUMAE +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
SIAM Journal on Computing, 2016 Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic ...
Shaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu
openaire +2 more sources
Opinion dynamics with confirmation bias. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2014 Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way that is consistent with one's preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and even scientific practices.
Armen E Allahverdyan, Aram Galstyan
doaj +1 more source
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
CoRR, 2022 An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized. For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility ...
Itai Arieli +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Bayesian Persuasive Driving [PDF]
2019 American Control Conference (ACC), 2019 In the autonomous driving area, interaction between vehicles is still a piece of puzzle which has not been fully resolved. The ability to intelligently and safely interact with other vehicles can not only improve self driving quality but also be beneficial to the global driving environment.
Cheng Peng, Masayoshi Tomizuka
openaire +2 more sources
BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION [PDF]
International Economic Review, 2017 This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of
Felgenhauer, M, Loerke, P
openaire +2 more sources
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
CoRR, 2021 The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the sender is powerful enough to communicate separately with each receiver (a.k.a.
Babichenko, Yakov +3 more
openaire +4 more sources