Results 11 to 20 of about 942,691 (276)
Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
SSRN Electronic JournalIn this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g., Kamenica and ...
Youichiro Higashi +2 more
semanticscholar +5 more sources
Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data (e.g., to advertisers).
Yu-Qi Pan +3 more
semanticscholar +7 more sources
Leakage-Robust Bayesian Persuasion
Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and ComputationThis paper introduces the concept of leakage-robust Bayesian persuasion. Situated between public Bayesian persuasion and private Bayesian persuasion, leakage-robust persuasion considers a setting where one or more signals privately communicated by a ...
Nika Haghtalab, Ming-Da Qiao, Kunhe Yang
semanticscholar +5 more sources
Bayesian explanations for persuasion [PDF]
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2023 The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with ...
Little, Andrew T, Andrew T Little
core +5 more sources
American Economic Review, 2011 2590 Suppose one person, call him Sender, wishes to persuade another, call her Receiver, to change her action. If Receiver is a rational Bayesian, can Sender persuade her to take an action he would prefer over the action she was originally going to take?
M. Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica
semanticscholar +4 more sources
Journal of Political Economy MicroeconomicsA sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so ...
Elliot Lipnowski +2 more
semanticscholar +4 more sources
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023 Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior.
Martino Bernasconi +5 more
semanticscholar +3 more sources
Verbalized Bayesian Persuasion
CoRRInformation design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often model information ...
Wenhao Li +5 more
semanticscholar +3 more sources
Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse [PDF]
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 2022 When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision.
Heidari, Hoda +5 more
core +5 more sources
Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion with Combinatorial Actions
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022 Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver.
Sakaue, Shinsaku, Fujii, Kaito
core +4 more sources