Results 11 to 20 of about 1,169 (252)

Bayesian explanations for persuasion [PDF]

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022
The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier to send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the sender and receiver have common interest, (3) the ...
Little, Andrew T, Andrew T Little
core   +5 more sources

Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion with Combinatorial Actions

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In algorithmic Bayesian persuasion, we are interested in efficiently designing the sender's signaling schemes that lead ...
Kaito Fujii, Shinsaku Sakaue
openaire   +3 more sources

Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 2022
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage.
Keegan Harris, Valerie Chen, Joon Sik Kim, Ameet Talwalkar, Hoda Heidari, Zhiwei Steven Wu   +5 more
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Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors [PDF]

Journal of Economic Theory, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ricardo Alonso, Odilon Câmara
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Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
AbstractDrawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex‐ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party's strength and commits
Hennigs, Raphaela, Hennigs, R., Raphaela Hennigs   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

CoRR, 2021
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility. This can be relaxed by considering an online learning framework in which the sender repeatedly faces a receiver of ...
castiglioni Matteo, marchesi Alberto, celli Andrea, Gatti Nicola   +3 more
openaire   +6 more sources

Private Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. a persuasion problem) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal probability distributions. As in the standard Bayesian persuasion model, the sender has access to additional information regarding the action
Celli, Andrea, Coniglio, Stefano, Gatti, Nicola   +2 more
core   +7 more sources

BNTree for Predicting Persuasion Effect in Digital Era Crisis Communication

Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
With rapid digital transformation, online information and reviews have become more consequential, which may lead to a public opinion crisis. How to predict the persuasion effect is an important research problem in the design of a crisis communication ...
Wanglai Li, Hanzhe Yang, Huizhang Shen, Zhangxue Huang   +3 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Limiting Sender's Information in Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.
Ichihashi, Shota
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Online Bayesian Persuasion. [PDF]

, 2020
No abstract ...
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti   +3 more
openaire   +3 more sources