Results 131 to 140 of about 23,458 (274)
The Effects of Regulatory Office Closures on Bank Behavior
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We investigate if the decentralized structure of regulatory office networks influences supervisory outcomes and bank behavior. Following the closure of an office, banks previously supervised by that office increase their lending and risk‐taking.
IVAN LIM, JENS HAGENDORFF, SETH ARMITAGE
wiley +1 more source
VPRS 15935 Court of Insolvency Register
This series was created to record the court's decision with regard to an application for an Order of Sequestration and related court orders.<br/><br/>The role of the Insolvency Court was to:<br/>- hear and determine Orders of ...
core
Bank Opacity and Safe Asset Moneyness
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract A bank is more effective as a supplier of money‐like safe assets when (i) its return on equity (ROE) is relatively lower and (ii) it is relatively more opaque about its balance sheet. A model is presented to support this, emphasizing that safe asset investors focus on the left tail of the collateral value distribution.
SANG RAE KIM
wiley +1 more source
Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the United Kingdom and Italy, and the European Court of Justice Case Law [PDF]
The current paper explores the application and revision process of the Ac-quired Rights Directive in the context of insolvency proceedings, focusing on the role of community and national (British and Italian) case law.
Giuseppe Sigillò Massara
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Banks of a Feather: The Informational Advantage of Being Alike
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract Banks lend more to banks that are similar to them. Using data from the German credit register and proprietary supervisory data on the quality of banks' loan portfolio, we show that a similar portfolio of the lending and borrowing bank helps to overcome information asymmetries in interbank markets.
PETER BEDNAREK +3 more
wiley +1 more source
How Canadian seniors make decision about insolvency? [PDF]
Heliyon, 2023 Amine S, Predelus W.
europepmc +1 more source
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We evaluate whether deposit insurance (DI) promotes liquidity by influencing depositor behavior. We use the postal savings (PS) system and state‐adopted DI schemes during the 1920s to examine the effect of bank suspensions on PS deposit growth in pairs of border cities (DI versus non‐DI).
Lee K. Davison, Carlos D. Ramirez
wiley +1 more source
Unequal and Unstable: Income Inequality and Bank Risk
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We present a model in which income inequality interacts with banks' risk‐taking incentives, generating financial instability. Competition and deposit insurance cause some banks to lend to lower‐income borrowers at underpriced rates, creating “risky banks” that fail in downturns, while others lend to higher‐income borrowers and avoid default ...
YULIYAN MITKOV, ULRICH SCHÜWER
wiley +1 more source
Cross-border insolvency: adoption of CLERP 8 as an evolution of Australian insolvency law
, 2003 In 1997 the United Nations adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and recommended that member states adopt it as part of domestic legislation.
Mason, Rosalind
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Banking with Inside Money: An Efficiency Analysis
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We show that banks do not decentralize the first best in a nominal Diamond–Dybvig economy with inside money. Furthermore, state‐contingent deposit contracts do not expand the consumption possibility set to include the first best either. Central banks can improve welfare but only for savers and only with unconventional monetary policy. Finally,
DAVID RIVERO +1 more
wiley +1 more source