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Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental [PDF]
, 1998 ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something wouldipso factocease to exist.’ Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl's phenomenology,
Crane, Tim
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Classical Intentionality [PDF]
Erkenntnis, 2006 In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and ...
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Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed [PDF]
, 2017 A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome.
Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha, Kneer, Markus
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Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience & Mental Health, 2020 Researchers use the terms “emotion” and “intentionality” with different meanings. There are distinctions between the functional emotion state, its conscious experience, our ability to attribute emotions to others, our ability to think and talk about ...
Orestis Giotakos
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How Many Concepts of Intentionality?
Studia Humana, 2015 The current discussion of the intentionality nature has become more sophisticated and complex. In this paper I will delineate a number of approaches to intentionality in contemporary philosophy: 1 mentalistic; 2 semantic / linguistic; 3 pragmatic; 4 ...
Dąbrowski Andrzej
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3.2. Ontologia sociale e intenzionalità: quattro tesi
Rivista di Estetica, 2012 I put forward four these concerning phenomenologically clarifying criteria to characterise social entities. The first thesis maintains that social entities have a sui generis ontological status: unlike natural and ideal entities, social entities depend ...
Francesca De Vecchi
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Is Affective Intentionality Necessarily Irrelevant in Social Cognition?
Phenomenology and Mind, 2016 The aim of this work is to understand the meaning and the extent of “affective intentionality”, to discover whether or not it is analogous to other concepts of intentionality and if it can play a role in social cognition.
Sarah Songhorian
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
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“Platonismo sociale”? In difesa del realismo fenomenologico in ontologia sociale
Rivista di Estetica, 2012 In my paper, I will address two issues on the characterisation of social objects as subject-dependent objects: (i) Does phenomenological realism imply Platonism in social ontology?
Francesca De Vecchi
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Minds, Brains and Programs [PDF]
, 1980 This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations ...
Searle, John
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