Results 21 to 30 of about 157,592 (296)
According to the shared intentionality hypothesis proposed by Michael Tomasello, two cognitive upgrades – joint and collective intentionality, respectively – make human thinking unique.
Ladislav Koreň
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Making the Social World, or on Making Our Everyday Life World
I will argue for three principal claims that found the structure of the present issue of “Phenomenology and Mind” and represent three Leitmotive of the papers in it collected.
Francesca De Vecchi
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Radykalna interpretacja intencjonalności w filozofii Martina Heideggera (Radical interpretation of intentionality in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy) [PDF]
The aim of this paper is to present Martin Heidegger’s view on intentionality. We start from initial observations on the phenomenon of intentionality (here we refer to four possible concepts of intentionality: mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and ...
Andrzej Dąbrowski
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What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism [PDF]
This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states?
Golob, Sacha
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Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43).
Angelica Kaufmann
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Actual Intentionalism vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism
In 'An Intentional Demonstration?" I defended an argument, suggested by if not directly due to E. D. Hirsch, for the conclusion that one of the truth-conditions of at least some kinds of interpretive statements about poems is that they be underwritten by meanings intended by the author. ' The argument proceeded via a particular example of two evidently
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Consciousness and intentionality [PDF]
Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential ...
Bourget, David, Mendelovici, Angela
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Doświadczenie sztuki w fenomenologii kontr-intencjonalnej i nie-intencjonalnej
The article raises the subject of intentionality of art in the light of transformations that counter-intentional phenomenology and non-intentional phenomenology have undergone. The changes to the way intentionality was understood substantially influenced
Andrzej Krawiec
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The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents vs. Direct Grasp [PDF]
Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual ...
Brentano F C. +18 more
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Intentionality versus Constructive Empiricism [PDF]
By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism – B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science – is inconsistent.
BC Fraassen van +6 more
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