Results 211 to 220 of about 186,627 (261)

Who should break the silos in One Health for global health security? an African perspective. [PDF]

Pan Afr Med J
Wirsiy FS, Dzekem DR, Tahmo NB, Chika UC, Kwemu CN, Yeika EV, Ako-Arrey DE.   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source

"Navigating Healthy Waters": monitoring ship wastewater as a key defense against infectious diseases-a pilot study on a Mediterranean seaport. [PDF]

Front Public Health
Federigi I, Zotti N, Pellegrini M, Verani M, Pagani A, Lattanzi A, Salvadori A, Carducci A, Rizzo C.   +8 more
europepmc   +1 more source

One Health Approach in Ukraine: Current Status and Prospects for Implementation. [PDF]

Infect Dis Clin Microbiol
Gerilovych A, Shevchenko N, Pishchanskyi O, Aliekseieva H, Rosada M, Gerilovych I, Okaievych O.   +6 more
europepmc   +1 more source

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Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement

Environmental and Resource Economics, 1997
For international environmental problems involving many countries, such as, e.g., the climate problem, it is unlikely that all countries will participate in an international environmental agreement. If some countries commit themselves to cooperate, while the remaining countries act independently and in pure self-interest, it appears to be possible to ...
Michael Hoel, Schneider Kerstin
exaly   +2 more sources

The Agreement and International Environmental Law

Abstract This chapter explores the substantial influence of international environmental law on the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) as well as the BBNJ Agreement’s potential ...
exaly   +2 more sources

International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries [PDF]

Computational Economics, 2010
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
M. BIANCARDI, VILLANI, GIOVANNI
openaire   +2 more sources

Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

International Transactions in Operational Research, 2013
AbstractThis paper proposes a dynamic game model of the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). The model assumes that both the number of signatory countries and the stock of accumulated pollution evolve over time, as a result of countries’ emission and membership decisions.
Michèle Breton, Samar Garrab
openaire   +2 more sources

International Environmental Agreements

Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2015
The regulation of environmental externalities at the global level requires international agreements between sovereign states. Game theory provides an appropriate theoretical tool for analysis. However, game theory can result in a wide range of outcomes, and therefore it is important to discuss the assumptions and mechanisms of the different approaches ...
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The structure of international environmental agreements

SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
Climate change (asymmetrically) affects all countries. Hence, the reduction of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (asymmetrically) benefits most, if not all, countries. However, each country individually bears the (sometimes relevant) cost of domestic policies designed to control greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions.
openaire   +2 more sources