Results 221 to 230 of about 186,627 (261)
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Stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model*
Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2008zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jin Zhang, Shouyang Wang, Lei Zu
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Sober Optimism and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Larry Karp, Hiroaki Sakamoto
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International Environmental Agreements with reference points
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2014Whether or not the current climate talks achieve a meaningful treaty, the current negotiation forms important reference points for future negotiations. In this paper, we introduce reference points to a canonical model of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs).
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International Environmental Agreements
2005AbstractThis chapter explains why international agreements have increasingly been used to address international cooperation problems. It outlines the process of treaty making, and explains how process can shape outcomes. It then details the key features of treaties, such as the minimum participation level, basic obligations, withdrawal, and the use of ...
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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Oxford Economic Papers, 1994Effective management of international environmental resources requires cooperation, and in practice cooperation is usually codified in international environmental agreements (IEAs). The essential feature of IEAs is that they cannot be enforced by a third party. This paper explores the properties of self-enforcing IEAs using two models.
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Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA.
Nahid Masoudi, Georges Zaccour
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International environmental agreements and asymmetric information
1997The paper explores the effect of asymmetric information on international environmental agreements.
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Overlapping International Environmental Agreements
Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2015The perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental and global pollutants.
Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, Xie Zhu
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The effectiveness of international environmental agreements
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2012Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution.
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Asymmetries in international environmental agreements
Environment and Development Economics, 2012AbstractThis paper considers self-enforcing international environmental agreements when countries are asymmetric with respect to emission-related benefits and environmental damage. Considering these asymmetries simultaneously yields large stable coalitions, also without the option of transfers between signatories. However, these large stable coalitions
Pavlova, Yulia, de Zeeuw, Aart
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