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Ηθικά ερωτήματα στην πρακτική των στοχευμένων ανθρωποκτονιών ως μέσων πολέμου & τρομοκρατίας. Ένας διάλογος μεταξύ των Michael Walzer & Jeff Mcmahan. [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
The essay addresses the common sense beliefs about the morality of killing in war, which is the prevailing nowadays, presented by Michael Walzer in comparison with Jeff Mcmahan’ s view, called by him as “deep morality”. The last one reject walzer’s endorsement that once a war has begun, all combatants are moral equals, both the fighters for the just ...
Ypsilanti Christina   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Proportionality in Self-Defense and War

open access: yes, 2010
Jeff McMahan, Rutgers University, explores proportionality in law, self-defense and acts of ...
McMahan, Jeff
core   +2 more sources

Moral certainty and the wrongness of killing: A non‐propositional view

open access: yesPhilosophical Investigations, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 170-194, April 2026.
Abstract In 2008 I published a paper making the case that Wittgenstein's On Certainty reflections can be fruitfully extended to cast light on the foundations of our moral lives and practices. My primary example was that the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty.
Nigel Pleasants
wiley   +1 more source

Animal Rights, Moral Motivation, and the Experience of Wonder

open access: yesJournal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 43, Issue 1, Page 112-127, February 2026.
ABSTRACT Despite being strong, arguments for animal rights often fail to motivate. One reason for this is that rights are associated with concepts, such as respect, that are difficult to apply to nonhuman animals. These concepts are difficult to apply because they are implicitly grounded in the special status of humans.
Steve Cooke
wiley   +1 more source

Accidentally Killing on Purpose Again: Intentions Under Uncertainty

open access: yesRatio, Volume 38, Issue 4, Page 228-238, December 2025.
ABSTRACT Many philosophers believe that intentions are relevant to the justification of harm—they believe that intentional harms, or harms that result from intentionally affecting or using another person, are harder to justify than harms that are merely foreseen.
Patrick Tomlin
wiley   +1 more source

Revenge Wars

open access: yesPhilosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 4, Page 344-353, Fall 2025.
ABSTRACT In the wake of widescale deadly attacks, desire and support for military revenge are prevalent. Rather than dismissing it as due to ignorance, moral depravity or heat of the moment, I propose that support for military revenge is more charitably understood as support for a “retributive revenge war,” aimed at inflicting deserved harms on the ...
Uri Eran
wiley   +1 more source

Toward Noninvasively Imaging pH at the Surface of Implanted Orthopedic Devices in Live Rabbits Using X‐ray Excited Luminescence Chemical Imaging

open access: yesAdvanced Healthcare Materials, Volume 14, Issue 25, September 26, 2025.
Imaging pH in a live rabbit at the surface of a sensor‐coated titanium plate using X‐ray excited luminescent chemical imaging (XELCI). A raster scanning X‐ray beam generates radioluminescence from a spot on the sensor, and the luminescence passes through the tissue and is collected at two wavelengths to determine local pH.
Unaiza Uzair   +6 more
wiley   +1 more source

In defense of no one

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 676-695, September 2025.
Abstract According to the Wrong Restriction, we are liable to defensive harm only when we threaten to wrong others. While attractive on a first pass, we argue that plausible philosophical claims make the Wrong Restriction difficult to accept. In its place, we offer the Impermissibility Restriction, according to which one is liable to defensive harm ...
Joseph Bowen, James Goodrich
wiley   +1 more source

Life has value, but non-existence does not

open access: yes, 2018
Epicurus argued that death is not bad for the one who dies, because death is annihilation of the experiencing subject and we need a subject of badness for anything to be bad.
Southan, Rhys, Rhys Southan
core   +1 more source

Starting and Stopping Wars

open access: yesPacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 2, Page 96-106, June 2025.
ABSTRACT If a warring side may fight in pursuit of an aim up to some proportionality‐respecting limit, then an important question is whether that side is morally required to stop fighting when it reaches that limit, despite not yet having attained its aim.
Gerald Lang
wiley   +1 more source

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