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Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 1988Abstract This paper tests the implicit contract hypothesis using data in the Japanese labor market. The empirical results suggest that implicit contract relations in real terms are not rejected in the Japanese labor market. This finding gives evidence (i) that a certain degree of observed wage rigidity reflects the outcome of efficient risk-sharing ...
Hiroshi Osano, Touru Inoue
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Labor Market Regulation Under Self-Enforcing Contracts
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017AbstractThis paper examines the effects of various labor market institutions (policies) on the welfare of workers and employers. We consider self‐enforcing contracts between risk‐averse workers and risk‐neutral employers in a labor market with search frictions.
Avcioglu, Sahin, Karabay, Bilgehan
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Labor Market: Incentives, Wages and Contracts
2016Prendergast (1999) begins his widely known survey of incentives of the firm with the sentence “incentives are the essence of the economy.” Hardly any economist would disagree with the idea that economic agents react to the incentives they face, even more so if a significant number of individuals have motivations beyond their own self interest and have ...
Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales
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Labor Market Immobility and Incentive Contract Design
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018Research suggests that restricted labor mobility discourages managers from investing in human capital and reduces firm value. However, whether firms re-incentivize managers to mitigate its adverse effects remains unexplored. We find that after the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (an exogenous negative shock to managers’ mobility), firms ...
Chen Lin, Lai Wei, Nan Yang
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Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011This paper analyzes a labor market, where firms offer workers incentive contracts and make decisions about irreversible capital investments. The state authority regulates the institutional framework by choosing the level of unemployment benefits and the workers' bargaining power. Our results suggest that unemployment benefits reduce workers' incentives
Martina Nikolaeva Gogova +1 more
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Contracts, Job Experience, and Cyclical Labor Market Adjustments
Journal of Labor Economics, 1983Longitudinal estimates of the variability of individual wages, hours, and weeks worked over the course of changing demand states are provided for all workers generally and for workers of varied levels of job experience. Emphasis is placed on that part of job experience represented as years on current job, a commonly used proxy for the magnitude of firm-
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Journal of Labor Economics, 2010
This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting
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This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting
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Temporary Contracts and Work—Family Balance in a Dual Labor Market
ILR Review, 2013A well-established finding in the literature is that self-employment enables mothers to accommodate work and family needs better than when they are engaged in organizational employment. With this result in mind, the authors investigate within a dual system of job protection if women under temporary contracts face greater work-family conflicts than ...
Rocio Bonet +3 more
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Introducing a new job contract into the Labor Market:
2007We propose to implement and simulate an economic model that studies the potential effects of the introduction of a new type of a job contract into the French labor market. This transition from a classical economic model to an agent-based simulation allows us to reproduce the same tendencies found in the former one and to observe a new dimension that ...
Lewkovicz, Zach, Kant, Jean-Daniel
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Labor Market Frictions into Staggered Wage Contracts [PDF]
Economics Bulletin, 2006 This paper proposes a generalization of the Calvo wage-setting equation, which embeds labor market frictions in the form of a Nash wage bargain. Adding labor market frictions changes significantly the dynamics of the standard wage-setting equation, such that it may have non-trivial implications for the design of optimal monetary policy, and could ...
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