Results 201 to 210 of about 327 (244)
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Quotation and the liar paradox
Analysis, 1986La solution du paradoxe du Menteur en termes de citation proposee par L. Goldstein (" The Paradox of the Liar - a Case of Mistaken Identity ", Analysis, 45.1., 1985, p. 9-13) n'est ni suffisamment generale, ni meme correcte dans son analyse des implications de la theorie davidsonienne de la ...
Buckner, Dean, Smith, Peter
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The liar paradox and fuzzy logic
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 2000AbstractCan one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying “xis true” and satisfying the “dequotation schema”for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Łukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.
Petr Hájek 0001 +2 more
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Analysis, 1995
The most obvious difference between Yablo's paradox and traditional versions of the Liar is that Yablo's paradox is generated by considering an infinite collection of sentences (So, S1, and for each n, Sn). If we restrict ourselves to a finite collection of the Sn, then no paradox arises. The upshot of this is that there is no first-order derivation of
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The most obvious difference between Yablo's paradox and traditional versions of the Liar is that Yablo's paradox is generated by considering an infinite collection of sentences (So, S1, and for each n, Sn). If we restrict ourselves to a finite collection of the Sn, then no paradox arises. The upshot of this is that there is no first-order derivation of
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Liar-type Paradoxes and the Incompleteness Phenomena
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2015zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Makoto Kikuchi, Taishi Kurahashi
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Are the Sorites and Liar Paradox of a Kind?
2012In this paper I consider attempts to unify the liar and sorites paradoxes. I argue that while they both may be said to exhibit indeterminacy and be alike in this respect, attempts to model the indeterminacy by way of a paracomplete logic result in the two paradoxes diverging in their logical structure in the face of extended paradoxes. If, on the other
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Semantics and the Liar Paradox
1989The semantical paradoxes are not a scientific subject like Inductive Definitions, Algebraic Geometry or Plasma Physics. At least not yet. On the other hand the paradoxes exert a strong fascination and many a philosopher or logician has spent some thought on them, mostly in relative isolation.
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The Liar Paradox and the Stoics
1999Abstract The external history of the ancient versions of the Liar paradox is easily traced. We know that it was probably invented by Eubulides, and a version of it may have been known by Aristotle. A development of Aristotle’s view can be found in the anonymous commentary on the Sophistical Refutations traditionally ascribed to Alexander
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