Results 261 to 270 of about 1,705,638 (353)

Strategic Flip‐Flopping in Political Competition

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame‐perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large.
Gaëtan Fournier   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Generalized Pentagon Equations. [PDF]

open access: yesAnn Henri Poincare
Alekseev A, Naef F, Ren M.
europepmc   +1 more source

The Lie algebra of a smooth manifold

open access: yes, 1954
M. Shanks, L. E. Pursell
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Limit Orders and Knightian Uncertainty

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A wide variety of financial instruments allows risk‐averse traders to reduce their exposure to risk. This raises the question of what financial instruments allow ambiguity‐averse traders to reduce their exposure to ambiguity. We show in this paper that price‐contingent orders, such as limit orders, are sufficient: In a two‐period trading model,
Michael Greinecker, Christoph Kuzmics
wiley   +1 more source

Characterizing barren plateaus in quantum ansätze with the adjoint representation. [PDF]

open access: yesNat Commun
Fontana E   +7 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Learning in random utility models via online decision problems

open access: yesInternational Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper examines the Random Utility Model (RUM) in repeated stochastic choice settings where decision‐makers lack full information about payoffs. We propose a gradient‐based learning algorithm that embeds RUM into an online decision‐making framework.
Emerson Melo
wiley   +1 more source

Campaign spending in elections with micro‐targeting and ideologically biased voters

open access: yesInternational Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.
Abstract We study interactions between campaign spending and ideology in an election where two parties compete over an electorate with ideologically biased voters. The parties target voters with costly persuasive effort, which, together with ideology, defines the party each voter votes for.
Marco Magnani
wiley   +1 more source

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