Results 131 to 140 of about 1,223 (219)

Strategic enforcement of linear payoff relations in a three-player strictly alternating prisoner's dilemma game. [PDF]

Sci Rep
Taha MA, Mersal SS, Brikaa MG.
europepmc   +1 more source

Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty

We propose to bring together two conceptually complementary ideas: (1) selfconfi?rming equilibrium (SCE): at a rest point of learning dynamics in a game played recurrently, agents best respond to confi?rmed beliefs, i.e.
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci   +3 more
core  

Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated.
Nadia Burani, Ester Manna
wiley   +1 more source

Drivers of cooperation in social dilemmas on higher-order networks. [PDF]

J R Soc Interface
Sadekar O, Civilini A, Latora V, Battiston F.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley   +1 more source

Academic achievement helps coordination on mutually advantageous outcomes. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Brocas I, Carrillo JD.
europepmc   +1 more source

Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley   +1 more source

Social learning with complex contagion. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Chiba-Okabe H, Plotkin JB.
europepmc   +1 more source

Organized Crime, Corruption, and Economic Growth

Journal of Regional Science, Volume 65, Issue 2, Page 535-560, March 2025.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we study the relationship between organized crime, corruption, and economic growth on a data set from Italian regions for the period 1996–2013. Our working hypothesis is that organized crime can embezzle part of the public expenditure aimed at productive uses by threatening and bribing public officers. To assess the consequences
Tamara Fioroni, Andrea Mario Lavezzi, Giovanni Trovato   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games. [PDF]

Dyn Games Appl
Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source