Results 31 to 40 of about 1,223 (219)

Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient

open access: yes, 2004
The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition ...
Drew Fudenberg   +2 more
core   +1 more source

Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the payoff
Flesch, Janos, Predtetchinski, Arkadi
core   +1 more source

Researcher–Entrepreneur Relationship and Performance of Innovative Startups

open access: yesInternational Journal of Finance &Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Many innovative startups are joint ventures between researchers and entrepreneurs, who collaborate in R&D and product commercialization. Government policies such as grants, subsidies, and patent licensing fees act as Pigouvian subsidies, incentivizing R&D by bridging the gap between the social and private returns of innovation.
Yangguang Huang, Helen Hui
wiley   +1 more source

Impact of Geography on Institutions in Agricultural and Nomadic Societies

open access: yesInternational Studies of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT How geography affects the choice of institutions is studied in a theoretical model. In this model, nations are located around a circle. Rulers compete through choosing tax rates, the level of military spending, and the degree of formality of institutions. Geographic condition is captured by population density.
Haiwen Zhou
wiley   +1 more source

Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring.
Yuichi Yamamoto
core  

Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
We develop the notion of perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium-perfect BNE-in general Bayesian games. We test perfect BNE against the criteria laid out by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Flesch, Janos   +2 more
core   +1 more source

The Role of Admission Probabilities in the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: An Experimental Study

open access: yesInternational Studies of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Although students theoretically need not consider admission probabilities under strategy‐proof mechanisms in school choice problems, our study reveals a significant correlation between students' applications and their beliefs about admission probabilities in the deferred acceptance mechanism.
Shuxian Hong, Yi Yang
wiley   +1 more source

Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient [PDF]

open access: yes, 2007
We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one.
Levine, David   +2 more
core   +1 more source

Covering Up for Coworkers: A Scale Development and Empirical Examination of Relational Cover‐Up Behavior

open access: yesJournal of Organizational Behavior, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Why do employees conceal their coworkers' unethical behavior and who is most likely to do so? To address these questions, we begin by developing and validating a psychometrically robust measure of relational cover‐up behavior (Study 1). Using a two‐wave study (N = 475), we then test the argument that employees may experience an identity threat
Jenny H. Wang   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Auctions and Posted Prices in Directed Search Equilibrium

open access: yes, 2001
An open access copy of this article is available and complies with the copyright holder/publisher conditions.We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined alternatively by posting and by competing auctions ...
Julien, Benoit, Kennes, John, King, Ian
core   +1 more source

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