Results 71 to 80 of about 1,223 (219)
A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by
Yamamoto, Yuichi
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American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract How can defense alliances reap the efficiency gains of working together when coordination and opportunism costs are high? Although specializing as part of a collective comes with economic and functional benefits, states must bargain over the distribution of those gains and ensure the costs of collective action are minimized.
J. Andrés Gannon
wiley +1 more source
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Alliances are typically understood as agreements intended to deter aggression from enemy states. By signaling an ally's commitment to a protégé state, a shared enemy may be deterred from attacking. In light of this signaling logic, secret alliances are puzzling.
Peter Bils, Bradley C. Smith
wiley +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
, 2018 We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage ...
Ehud Lehrer +3 more
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Reviewing fast or slow: A theory of summary reversal in the judicial hierarchy
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Appellate courts with discretionary dockets have multiple ways to review lower courts. We develop a formal model that evaluates the trade‐offs between “full review”—which features full briefing, oral arguments, and signed opinions—versus “quick review,” where a higher court can summarily reverse a lower court. We show that having the option of
Alexander V. Hirsch +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation ...
Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin
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Mitigating policy uncertainty: What financial markets reveal about firm‐level lobbying
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Elections can lead to substantial policy changes and, thus, are a significant source of risk. Firms can respond to such policy uncertainty by lobbying, but it is hard to quantify whether they do so and, if so, how much lobbying benefits them. We construct a new dataset and leverage investors’ expectations of variability in stock returns in the
Kristy Buzard +2 more
wiley +1 more source
, 2020 In the paper, constructions of the generalized method of characteristics are applied for calculating the generalized minimax (viscosity) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations in dynamic bimatrix games.
Tarasyev, Alexander M. +1 more
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