Results 231 to 240 of about 44,368 (289)
Public Choice, 2005 The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as 'principals' and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as 'agents'.
Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan
openaire +2 more sources
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2000 In this paper, we present a citizen candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes It; particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the ...
Leonardo Felli, Antonio M. Merlo
openaire +8 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
2021
Stanley Harrold's “The Abolition Lobby, its Development, Successes, and Disintegration, 1836-1845,” brings to light the so-called abolition lobby—abolitionist activists, clergymen, and journalists determined to mobilize the caucus of northern Whig congressmen to propose antislavery legislation during the decade before the Mexican American War.
openaire +1 more source
Stanley Harrold's “The Abolition Lobby, its Development, Successes, and Disintegration, 1836-1845,” brings to light the so-called abolition lobby—abolitionist activists, clergymen, and journalists determined to mobilize the caucus of northern Whig congressmen to propose antislavery legislation during the decade before the Mexican American War.
openaire +1 more source
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006
AbstractWe study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy.
Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E.
openaire +4 more sources
AbstractWe study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy.
Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E.
openaire +4 more sources
British Journal of Nursing, 2009
When Lord Darzi of Denham, former health minister and architect of the new NHS reform agenda, said on leaving office in July that the health of the staff remained one of the most crucial areas of unfinished business, he was not far off the mark. Support for his view has now come from a recently published interim report by Dr Steve Boorman, a leading ...
openaire +2 more sources
When Lord Darzi of Denham, former health minister and architect of the new NHS reform agenda, said on leaving office in July that the health of the staff remained one of the most crucial areas of unfinished business, he was not far off the mark. Support for his view has now come from a recently published interim report by Dr Steve Boorman, a leading ...
openaire +2 more sources