Results 211 to 220 of about 136,009 (290)
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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2020
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V. Punčochář
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
V. Punčochář
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, 2002
Most theorists use ‘interrogative’ to refer to a type of sentence. Some theorists posit questions as distinct entities that may be asked, or put, or expressed by interrogatives, just as propositions may be expressed by declaratives and commands may be expressed by imperatives. Intuitively it seems that some questions may be expressed by sentences other
D. Harrah
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Most theorists use ‘interrogative’ to refer to a type of sentence. Some theorists posit questions as distinct entities that may be asked, or put, or expressed by interrogatives, just as propositions may be expressed by declaratives and commands may be expressed by imperatives. Intuitively it seems that some questions may be expressed by sentences other
D. Harrah
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Synthese, 2007
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
W. Jaworski
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
W. Jaworski
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, 1968
Publisher Summary Truth and falsity cannot be the properties of questions, because questions do not assert anything but instead request information. Thus, it makes no sense to speak of deductive connections between two questions—that is, of one question logically implying another. Hence, there cannot be logic of questions.
J. Katz
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Publisher Summary Truth and falsity cannot be the properties of questions, because questions do not assert anything but instead request information. Thus, it makes no sense to speak of deductive connections between two questions—that is, of one question logically implying another. Hence, there cannot be logic of questions.
J. Katz
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Logic of Questions and Public Announcements
Tbilisi Symposium on Logic, Language, and Computation, 2009This paper aims to explore the role of questions in communication in a group of cooperative rational agents. Using epistemic representation of questions proposed in [6] we employ the framework of public announcement logic to explore the flow of information in the process of asking and replying questions in a group.
M. Pelis, Ondrej Majer
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A Logic of Questions and Answers
Philosophy of Science, 1961A logic of questions and answers exists within the logic of statements, if we make the following identifications (roughly): “Whether” questions are identified with true exclusive disjunctions, and “which” questions are identified with true existential quantifications. The question-and-answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game.
D. Harrah
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984
In their classic work on the logic of explanation Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) claim that to explain the phenomena in the world of our experience is to answer the question “why?”, rather than the question “what?”. But there is a source of embarrassment, viz., the underdeveloped logic of why-questions itself.
M. Sintonen
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In their classic work on the logic of explanation Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) claim that to explain the phenomena in the world of our experience is to answer the question “why?”, rather than the question “what?”. But there is a source of embarrassment, viz., the underdeveloped logic of why-questions itself.
M. Sintonen
semanticscholar +2 more sources