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ON EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE
1986We consider the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic. We argue that the problem is due to the way in which knowledge and belief are captured in Hintikka's possible worlds semantics. We describe an alternative approach in which propositions are sets of worlds, and knowledge and belief are simply a list of propositions for each agent.
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Omnipotence and Logical Omniscience
Philosophy, 1987The alleged paradox of omnipotence is of interest mainly because, like so many of the better known paradoxes, its definitive solution has been hindered by the limitations of classical logic. The difficulty with sorting out a paradox so often turns out to be a question of how, precisely, to formalize an intuitively acceptable, but formally intractable ...
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Knowledge, Time, and the Problem of Logical Omniscience
Fundamenta Informaticae, 2011It is well known that Modal Epistemic logic (MEL) suffers from the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, we will argue that in order to solve the problem, the temporal dimension of knowledge has to be revealed and following this analysis, we present a general epistemic framework, timed Modal Epistemic Logic (tMEL), modified from MEL, such that
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Epistemic logic and logical omniscience II: A unifying framework
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2000The author surveyed in a Part I [ibid. 12, No. 1, 57-81 (1997; Zbl 0890.03006)] a collection of epistemic logics. The present second part provides a unifying framework for various existing epistemic logics modeling resource-bounded agents. The logic of implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), the logic of awareness (Fagin and Halpern) and the epistemic
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Knowledge, Time, and Logical Omniscience
2009Knowledge's acquisition happens in time. However, this feature is not reflected in the standard epistemic logics, e.g. S4 with its possible world semantics suggested by Hintikka in [1], and hence their applications are limited. In this paper we adapt these normal modal logics to increase their expressive power such that not only is what is known ...
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Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience
2022This chapter considers objections to Subjective Bayesian theories of credence and confirmation based on cases in which an agent supports a hypothesis based on evidence learned previously, and cases in which an agent is ignorant of logical truths. For each type of cases, the chapter carefully analyzes what exactly the objection is supposed to be. Then a
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Logical Omniscience Via Proof Complexity
2006The Hintikka-style modal logic approach to knowledge contains a well-known defect of logical omniscience, i.e., the unrealistic feature that an agent knows all logical consequences of her assumptions. In this paper, we suggest the following Logical Omniscience Test (LOT): an epistemic system E is not logically omniscient if for any valid in E knowledge
Sergei N. Artëmov, Roman Kuznets
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Avoiding Logical Omniscience by Using Subjective Situations
2000The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. Thepossible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient.
Antonio Moreno +2 more
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From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence
1997Epistemic or doxastic logic is often constructed on classical propositional logic to which a knowledge or belief operator B is added with the intended interpretation “I know that” or “I believe that”.
R. Lavendhomme, T. Lucas
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