Results 131 to 140 of about 313,842 (157)

Omnipotence and Logical Omniscience

Philosophy, 1987
The alleged paradox of omnipotence is of interest mainly because, like so many of the better known paradoxes, its definitive solution has been hindered by the limitations of classical logic. The difficulty with sorting out a paradox so often turns out to be a question of how, precisely, to formalize an intuitively acceptable, but formally intractable ...
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Knowledge, Time, and the Problem of Logical Omniscience

Fundamenta Informaticae, 2011
It is well known that Modal Epistemic logic (MEL) suffers from the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, we will argue that in order to solve the problem, the temporal dimension of knowledge has to be revealed and following this analysis, we present a general epistemic framework, timed Modal Epistemic Logic (tMEL), modified from MEL, such that
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Epistemic logic and logical omniscience II: A unifying framework

International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2000
The author surveyed in a Part I [ibid. 12, No. 1, 57-81 (1997; Zbl 0890.03006)] a collection of epistemic logics. The present second part provides a unifying framework for various existing epistemic logics modeling resource-bounded agents. The logic of implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), the logic of awareness (Fagin and Halpern) and the epistemic
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Knowledge, Time, and Logical Omniscience

2009
Knowledge's acquisition happens in time. However, this feature is not reflected in the standard epistemic logics, e.g. S4 with its possible world semantics suggested by Hintikka in [1], and hence their applications are limited. In this paper we adapt these normal modal logics to increase their expressive power such that not only is what is known ...
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Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience

2022
This chapter considers objections to Subjective Bayesian theories of credence and confirmation based on cases in which an agent supports a hypothesis based on evidence learned previously, and cases in which an agent is ignorant of logical truths. For each type of cases, the chapter carefully analyzes what exactly the objection is supposed to be. Then a
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SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE

Philosophical Issues, 2018
AbstractThis paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism's implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it's okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’.
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From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence

1997
Epistemic or doxastic logic is often constructed on classical propositional logic to which a knowledge or belief operator B is added with the intended interpretation “I know that” or “I believe that”.
R. Lavendhomme, T. Lucas
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Avoiding Logical Omniscience by Using Subjective Situations

2000
The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. Thepossible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient.
Antonio Moreno, Ulises Cortés, Ton Sales   +2 more
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Logical omniscience vs. logical ignorance on a dilemma of epistemic logic

1995
We propose in the paper a new solution to the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem of epistemic logic. Almost all attempts in the literature to solve this problem consist in weakening the standard epistemic systems: weaker sytems are considered where the agents do not possess the full reasoning capacities of an ideal reasoner. We shall argue that this
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The ‘Logical Omniscience’ of Reactive Systems

1991
The problem of ‘logical omniscience’ continues to engage attention in AI. In this paper it is argued that the problem arises from interpreting formal properties of epistemic logics into agent performance domains, where agent cognition is taken to incorporate formula-manipulation, which then mirrors inference in the logic.
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