Results 121 to 130 of about 280 (142)
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Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience

2022
This chapter considers objections to Subjective Bayesian theories of credence and confirmation based on cases in which an agent supports a hypothesis based on evidence learned previously, and cases in which an agent is ignorant of logical truths. For each type of cases, the chapter carefully analyzes what exactly the objection is supposed to be. Then a
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Avoiding Logical Omniscience by Using Subjective Situations

2000
The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. Thepossible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient.
Antonio Moreno   +2 more
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From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence

1997
Epistemic or doxastic logic is often constructed on classical propositional logic to which a knowledge or belief operator B is added with the intended interpretation “I know that” or “I believe that”.
R. Lavendhomme, T. Lucas
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Logical omniscience vs. logical ignorance on a dilemma of epistemic logic

1995
We propose in the paper a new solution to the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem of epistemic logic. Almost all attempts in the literature to solve this problem consist in weakening the standard epistemic systems: weaker sytems are considered where the agents do not possess the full reasoning capacities of an ideal reasoner. We shall argue that this
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Logical Omniscience and Inconsistent Belief

1993
Logical omniscience is the problem that we inherit from possible worlds analysis of cognitive propositional attitudes, such as knowledge and belief. The knowledge or belief of a cognitive agent is interpreted as being inversely proportional to its uncertainty. Possible worlds accessible to the agent define this uncertainty, since every such world might
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The ‘Logical Omniscience’ of Reactive Systems

1991
The problem of ‘logical omniscience’ continues to engage attention in AI. In this paper it is argued that the problem arises from interpreting formal properties of epistemic logics into agent performance domains, where agent cognition is taken to incorporate formula-manipulation, which then mirrors inference in the logic.
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Fragmentation, metalinguistic ignorance, and logical omniscience

Philosophical Studies, 2023
Jens Christian Bjerring, Weng Hong Tang
exaly  

Chapter 2 Impossible States at Work: Logical Omniscience and Rational Choice

Contributions To Economic Analysis, 2006
Mikael Cozic
exaly  

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