Results 111 to 120 of about 280 (142)

Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience

Studia Logica, 2002
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Antonio Moreno, Ulises Cortés, Ton Sales   +2 more
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Epistemic logic and logical omniscience: A survey

International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 1997
Reasoning about knowledge and belief has been investigated from the points of view of philosophy, game theory, distributed systems, and artificial intelligence. A formal framework for an investigation of reasoning about knowledge and belief is provided by epistemic logic.
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Logical Omniscience and the Cost of Deliberation

2001
Logical omniscience is a well known problem which makes traditional modal logics of knowledge, belief and intentions somewhat unrealistic from the point of view of modelling the behaviour of a resource bounded agent. We propose two logics which take into account 'deliberation time' but use a more or less standard possible worlds semantics with ...
Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan 0001
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ON EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE

1986
We consider the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic. We argue that the problem is due to the way in which knowledge and belief are captured in Hintikka's possible worlds semantics. We describe an alternative approach in which propositions are sets of worlds, and knowledge and belief are simply a list of propositions for each agent.
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Omnipotence and Logical Omniscience

Philosophy, 1987
The alleged paradox of omnipotence is of interest mainly because, like so many of the better known paradoxes, its definitive solution has been hindered by the limitations of classical logic. The difficulty with sorting out a paradox so often turns out to be a question of how, precisely, to formalize an intuitively acceptable, but formally intractable ...
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Knowledge, Time, and the Problem of Logical Omniscience

Fundamenta Informaticae, 2011
It is well known that Modal Epistemic logic (MEL) suffers from the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, we will argue that in order to solve the problem, the temporal dimension of knowledge has to be revealed and following this analysis, we present a general epistemic framework, timed Modal Epistemic Logic (tMEL), modified from MEL, such that
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God’s Omniscience and Logical Virtue

2015
exaly   +2 more sources

Epistemic logic and logical omniscience II: A unifying framework

International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2000
The author surveyed in a Part I [ibid. 12, No. 1, 57-81 (1997; Zbl 0890.03006)] a collection of epistemic logics. The present second part provides a unifying framework for various existing epistemic logics modeling resource-bounded agents. The logic of implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), the logic of awareness (Fagin and Halpern) and the epistemic
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Knowledge, Time, and Logical Omniscience

2009
Knowledge's acquisition happens in time. However, this feature is not reflected in the standard epistemic logics, e.g. S4 with its possible world semantics suggested by Hintikka in [1], and hence their applications are limited. In this paper we adapt these normal modal logics to increase their expressive power such that not only is what is known ...
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Logical Omniscience Via Proof Complexity

2006
The Hintikka-style modal logic approach to knowledge contains a well-known defect of logical omniscience, i.e., the unrealistic feature that an agent knows all logical consequences of her assumptions. In this paper, we suggest the following Logical Omniscience Test (LOT): an epistemic system E is not logically omniscient if for any valid in E knowledge
Sergei N. Artëmov, Roman Kuznets
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