Results 251 to 260 of about 314,970 (283)

Managerial ownership and performance

Journal of Business Research, 2009
Abstract This study revisits the classical debate about the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance by using a semi-parametric estimation approach. The semi-parametric approach helps sidestep concerns associated with the potential misspecification of parametric models (e.g., the arbitrary choice of a fixed ...
Florackis, Chrisostomos   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

The rise in managerial stock ownership

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2000
Despite the widespread view from Berle and Means onward that ownership of U.S. companies has become increasingly separated from managerial control, the authors report that managerial ownership of public corporations is markedly higher today than in 1935.
Clifford G. Holderness   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Managerial ownership and firm valuation

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2003
Abstract We study the relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's q ( Q ) for 123 Japanese firms from 1987 to 1995. Managers in Japanese firms own a smaller stake in their firms relative to their US counterparts. Our initial analyses using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model show a negative (positive) relation between Q and ...
Carl R. Chen, Weiyu Guo, Vivek Mande
openaire   +1 more source

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

Journal of Accounting Research, 2007
ABSTRACTIn this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines,
Ryan LaFond, Sugata Roychowdhury
openaire   +1 more source

Managerial ownership of voting rights

Journal of Financial Economics, 1985
Abstract Managers of firms with dual classes of common stock can choose different quantities of votes for a given cash flow interest by choosing different quantities of the two securities. We study managerial stock holdings in 45 dual class firms and find that vote ownership per se is an important motivation for these holdings in that corporate ...
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo
openaire   +1 more source

Managerial Ownership and Corporate Hedging

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2007
Abstract: Using information on 443 UK non‐financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as ...
openaire   +2 more sources

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