Results 11 to 20 of about 13,763,508 (305)
Mechanism design for pandemics. [PDF]
Rev Econ Des, 2022 Under normal circumstances, competitive markets do an excellent job of supplying the goods that members of society want and need. But in an emergency like a pandemic, unassisted markets may not suffice. Imagine, for example, that society suddenly needs to obtain tens (or even hundreds) of millions of COVID-19 virus test kits a week.
Maskin E.
europepmc +4 more sources
Exploring the design applications of key emerging materials from natural sciences through a design ideation workshop [PDF]
, 2023 10th Congress of the International Association of Societies of Design Research (IASDR 2023) 9-13 October 2023, Milan, Italy202405 bcchVersion of ...
Wang, X +15 more
core +1 more source
Mechanism Design for Federated Sponsored Search Auctions [PDF]
, 2011 Recently there is an increase in smaller, domain-specific search engines that scour the deep web finding information that general-purpose engines are unable to discover.
Enrico H. Gerding +8 more
core +2 more sources
Symmetric Mechanism Design: Comment
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Chen, Bo, Knyazev, Dmitriy
openaire +4 more sources
Mechanism Design for Robotics [PDF]
Robotics, 2019 MEDER 2018, the IFToMM International Symposium on Mechanism Design for Robotics, was the fourth event of a series that was started in 2010 as a specific conference activity on mechanisms for robots [...]
Ceccarelli M., Gasparetto A.
openaire +4 more sources
Mechanism design and intentions [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been designed under the assumption that agents are selfish can ...
Felix J. Bierbrauer, Nick Netzer
openaire +11 more sources
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012 This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent.
DI TILLIO, ALFREDO +2 more
openaire +4 more sources
Theoretical Computer Science, 2006 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Davide Bilò +2 more
openaire +12 more sources
Games and Economic Behavior, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen
openaire +1 more source
Reverse Mechanism Design [PDF]
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015 Optimal mechanisms for agents with multi-dimensional preferences are generally complex. This complexity makes them challenging to solve for and impractical to run. In a typical mechanism design approach, a model is posited and then the optimal mechanism is designed for the model.
Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline
openaire +2 more sources