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Objective Moral Facts Exist in All Possible Universes
The question of whether a God is needed to justify or ground moral facts is mooted by the fact that true moral facts exist in all possible universes that contain rational agents. This can be demonstrated in three stages. First, it is necessarily the case
Richard Carrier
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C. S. Lewis and the Challenge of Ethics in Digital Society
This paper examines the idea that digital societies lack an ethical framework for understanding and mitigating the impact of digital technologies on human flourishing and the consequent diminishing of human agency.
Tibor Mahrik, Mark Neal
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Implicit Metaethical Intuitions: Validating and Employing a New IAT Procedure. [PDF]
Wagner JMJ, Pölzler T, Wright JC.
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Is Divine Law Indispensable to Moral Obligation? A Reply to Elizabeth Anscombe
This paper assesses Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential argument in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which holds that secular moral obligation is metaphysically incoherent without a divine law framework.
Jeffery Jay Lowder
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Ethical issues of the use of AI-driven mobile apps for education. [PDF]
Klimova B, Pikhart M, Kacetl J.
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Creation and use of organoids in biomedical research and healthcare: the bioethical and metabioethical issues. [PDF]
Stoeklé HC +3 more
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Values in evolutionary biology: a comparison between the contemporary debate on organic progress and Canguilhem's biological philosophy. [PDF]
De Cesare S.
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Metaethics and the Autonomy of Morality [PDF]
Some philosophers have been attracted to the idea that morality is an autonomous domain. One version of this idea is the thesis that non-moral claims are irrelevant to the justification of fundamental normative ethical theories.
Tristram McPherson
core
Critique of Metaethical Constructivism
Metaethical constructivism, proposed by Sharon Street, has been described as a novel and promising metaethical theory. It is a form of cognitivist anti-realism that purports to be without substantive normative assumptions, while still allowing for the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them.
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