Results 81 to 90 of about 9,967 (232)
Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds [PDF]
, 2017 Constitutivist accounts in metaethics explain the normative standards in a domain by appealing to the constitutive features of its members. The success of these accounts turns on whether they can explain the connection between normative standards and the
Lindeman, Kathryn
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Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists
Analytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley +1 more source
Women of Color and Philosophy [PDF]
, 2005 Book Review of Naomi Zack's Women of Color and ...
Bailey, Alison
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Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality [PDF]
, 2019 Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view.
Guardo, Andrea
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How to dissolve The moral problem [PDF]
Belgrade Philosophical AnnualAccording to Michael Smith, there is so much metaethical disagreement because it is difficult to explain both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgments in the framework provided by the Humean picture of human Psychology. Smith himself hoped
Suikkanen Jussi
doaj +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 510-526, March 2026.ABSTRACT According to the principle No Upwards Essence, there are no cases in which some x$x$ essentially depends on y$y$, yet grounds y$y$. One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue
Lisa Vogt
wiley +1 more source
Metaethical Implications [PDF]
, 2020 AbstractIn this chapter, we show that moral uncertainty creates a challenge for another metaethical view, namely non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgements are desires, or some other desire-like states, rather than beliefs. We show that it is surprisingly difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for non-cognitivists to accommodate moral ...
William MacAskill +2 more
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In opposition to alethic views of moral responsibility
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, Issue 1, Page 85-103, March 2026.Abstract A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for φ‐ing if and only if it is fitting to have—depending on the nature of φ—a negative or positive reactive emotion vis‐à‐vis A on account of A's φ‐ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness ...
Robert Pál‐Wallin
wiley +1 more source
Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism? [PDF]
, 2019 Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare.
Rubin, Michael, Schwenkenbecher, Anne
core +1 more source