Results 41 to 50 of about 1,269 (212)

Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley   +1 more source

The Paradox of Axiology. A Phenomenological Approach to Value Theory

Phenomenology and Mind, 2019
Are values more than measures of our needs and desires or internalized social and cultural rules of behaviour, originating in cultures and devoid of any universally accessible objectivity? Is there a place for values in a world of facts?
Roberta De Monticelli
doaj   +1 more source

Building blocks of morality

HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 2020
Most of us agree about the rules or norms of morality, what philosophers call substantive or normative ethics: be kind to small children, do not cheat on exams and return your library books on time.
Michael Ruse
doaj   +1 more source

From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails.
Alexios Stamatiadis‐Bréhier
wiley   +1 more source

Pluralist Pragmatism and Rationality

Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Thomas Kelly and Stuart Cohen argue that intuitions about rationality provide a direct argument against the pragmatist's claim that there are practical reasons for and against belief. Although Susanna Rinard offers an insightful response to their “Rationality Argument” on behalf of robust pragmatism (the view that there are only practical ...
Stephanie Leary
wiley   +1 more source

Naturalizing Metaethics

, 2016
Decades ago, it was suggested that epistemology could be naturalized, meaning, roughly, that it could be treated as an empirically-informed psychological inquiry. In more recent years, there has been a concerted effort to naturalize ethics, with a focus on questions in moral psychology, and occasional normative ethics. Less effort has been put into the
openaire   +2 more sources

Dispositions and Dependence

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT According to the principle No Upwards Essence, there are no cases in which some x$x$ essentially depends on y$y$, yet grounds y$y$. One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue
Lisa Vogt
wiley   +1 more source

‘Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought’, Edited by Reshef Adam-Segal and Edmund Dain

Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 2018
A review of Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought, edited by Reshef Adam-Segal and Edmund Dain.
Daniel Sharp
doaj   +1 more source

What Public Reason Liberals Do and Do Not Need to Say About Epistemology

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 107, Issue 1, Page 43-56, March 2026.
ABSTRACT An important question regarding public reason liberalism is how much (if anything) it needs to say about epistemology. This paper presents an answer to this question, arguing that the theory does not require reasonable citizens to hold any particular epistemological commitments (contra David Enoch's important critique), but does need to offer ...
Paul Billingham
wiley   +1 more source

Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley   +1 more source