Results 41 to 50 of about 3,064 (155)

Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

open access: yesStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2015
Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless.
Reichardt Bastian
doaj   +1 more source

Aesthetic Ethics without Evil. Aischron in Greek Popular Ethics [PDF]

open access: yesThe Polish Journal of Aesthetics, 2020
In the paper I consider the Greek term aischron as a candidate for a moral concept of evil, focusing on popular rather than philosophical Greek ethical thought.
Michał Bizoń
doaj   +1 more source

Love and the Basis of Dignity

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract It is often said that dignity is the ground of human rights. But what grounds dignity? According to proponents of the metaphysical view, dignity is grounded in our rational capacities, our sense of justice, or a disjunctive list of valuable capacities.
Jordan David Thomas Walters
wiley   +1 more source

A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered?
Matthew Vermaire
wiley   +1 more source

Metaethical Implications [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
AbstractIn this chapter, we show that moral uncertainty creates a challenge for another metaethical view, namely non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgements are desires, or some other desire-like states, rather than beliefs. We show that it is surprisingly difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for non-cognitivists to accommodate moral ...
William MacAskill   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics

open access: yesPacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley   +1 more source

Is There a Real Difference Between Undercutting and Rebutting?

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Defeaters in epistemology are the things that make justified beliefs lose their justification. Philosophers distinguish between different kinds of defeaters, and one such distinction is commonly made between rebutting and undercutting defeaters.
Dan Baras
wiley   +1 more source

Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
This paper explains three ways to develop a conceptual role view of meaning in metaethics. First, it suggests that there’s a way to combine inspiration from noncognitivism with a particular form of the conceptual role view to form a noncognitivist view ...
Chrisman, Matthew
core   +3 more sources

Fittingness and Bioethics

open access: yesRatio, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In bioethics, two sorts of normative categories are commonly used. These can be split into two families: the deontic categories, such as ‘right’, ‘ought to’ and ‘requirement’, and the evaluative categories, including ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘better than’ and ‘the best’. While other normative concepts such as ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ have also been discussed,
Ronan Ó Maonaile, James Hart
wiley   +1 more source

Non‐Naturalist Realism and Quietist Constructivism

open access: yesRatio, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Metaethical quietists propose views that share all the features of robust non‐naturalist realism, such as a commitment to cognitivism and irreducibly normative truths, except robust realist non‐naturalists' commitment to non‐natural properties.
Rach Cosker‐Rowland
wiley   +1 more source

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