Results 31 to 40 of about 220 (126)
Shared Agency in Modest Sociality
Journal of Social Ontology, 2014 A contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.
Kirk Ludwig
doaj
Shared Agency on Gilbert and deep continuity
Journal of Social Ontology, 2015 I compare Bratman’s theory with Gilbert’s. I draw attention to their similarities, query Bratman’s claim that his theory is the more parsimonious, and point to one theoretical advantage of Gilbert’s theory.
Smith Thomas H.
doaj +1 more source
Memory, intention, and movements of the mind
Mind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 3, Page 439-446, June 2026.This is a response to a discussion of two chapters of my recent book, Movements of the mind, that focus on the relation between intention and working memory. I argue that intention is a type of practical memory for action and that its properties are illuminated by drawing on empirical research on working memory.
Wayne Wu
wiley +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 3, Page 641-651, May 2026.ABSTRACT We are social animals that seek to live a life that is, in some sense, shared with others. But what exactly do we want in wanting to live a shared life? First, I seek to show that this question is not as straightforward as it might initially appear. Second, I present an answer to this question, which makes reference to the thought that we have
James Laing
wiley +1 more source
Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together
Journal of Social Ontology, 2014 A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
Michael E. Bratman
doaj
The Generality of Normative Thought
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 1, Page 51-64, January 2026.ABSTRACT What is it to think a generic normative thought of the form “Human beings should exercise regularly” or “Human beings must keep promises”? I argue that although such thoughts resemble, in different respects, intentions and evaluative beliefs, they are not, first and foremost, either of those types of states.
Jeremy David Fix
wiley +1 more source
Preparing for the worst: The irrationality of emotionally recalcitrant reasoning
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 501-516, December 2025.Abstract The question of what exactly is irrational about recalcitrant emotions—those that occur in tension or conflict with our beliefs—has been widely debated. Sabine Döring claims that such irrationality only emerges if we act on our recalcitrant emotion or engage in emotion‐relevant reasoning in light of it.
Ed Armitage
wiley +1 more source
Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency
Journal of Social Ontology, 2014 In an important new book on shared agency, Michael Bratman develops an account of the normative demand for the coordination of intentions amongst participants in shared agency. Bratman seeks to understand this form of normative guidance in terms of that
Abraham Sesshu Roth
doaj
Ecology and Evolution, Volume 15, Issue 11, November 2025.Urban gardens can play a vital role in supporting pollinator diversity and aiding ecosystem health amidst global declines in pollinators. This study analyzed plant–pollinator interactions in Mid‐Atlantic (USA) urban gardens using multispecies occupancy models, focusing on two native plants: Liatris spicata and Pycnanthemum muticum .
Nicholas J. Ruppel +6 more
wiley +1 more source