Results 31 to 40 of about 5,300 (172)
, 1993 RESUME : Cet article propose une reconstruction de la théorie de la rationalité dynamique esquissée par Michael Bratman dans Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Evaluer la rationalité de l\u27agent, dit Bratman, ce n\u27est pas simplement évaluer les
LIVINGSTON, Paisley Nathan
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Bratman i prakseologia minimalna
Ethics in Progress, 2013 The paper is an introductory essay to the Polish translation of M.E. Bratman’s paper The Fecundity of Planning Agency. Instead of summarizing the main drifts of Bratman’s work, the author tries to show a few important parallels between his approach to
Piotr Makowski
doaj +3 more sources
Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action [PDF]
, 2017 My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your ...
Brent, Michael
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Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley +1 more source
, 2018 In this paper, I argue that joint action permits a certain degree of luck. The cases I have in mind exhibit the following structure: each participant believes that the intended ends of each robustly support the joint action.
Schönherr, Julius
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Touching Through: The Puzzle of Mediated Contact
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT It is natural to think that one person touches another when their bodies make direct contact. However, much interpersonal touch is not like this. We often touch people through things like their clothing. But this raises a puzzle: How can you touch someone without directly touching the surface of their body?
William Hornett, Robert Morgan
wiley +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 3, Page 641-651, May 2026.ABSTRACT We are social animals that seek to live a life that is, in some sense, shared with others. But what exactly do we want in wanting to live a shared life? First, I seek to show that this question is not as straightforward as it might initially appear. Second, I present an answer to this question, which makes reference to the thought that we have
James Laing
wiley +1 more source
Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism [PDF]
, 2018 We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it.
Marušić, Berislav, Schwenkler, John
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The Generality of Normative Thought
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 1, Page 51-64, January 2026.ABSTRACT What is it to think a generic normative thought of the form “Human beings should exercise regularly” or “Human beings must keep promises”? I argue that although such thoughts resemble, in different respects, intentions and evaluative beliefs, they are not, first and foremost, either of those types of states.
Jeremy David Fix
wiley +1 more source
Who Cares How Congress Really Works? [PDF]
, 2016 Legislative intent is a fiction. Courts and scholars accept this, by and large. As this Article shows, however, both are confused as to why legislative intent is a fiction and as to what this fiction entails.
Doerfler, Ryan D.
core +4 more sources