Results 51 to 60 of about 485 (162)

Praxiology meets Planning Theory of Intention. Kotarbiński and Bratman on Plans [PDF]

, 2015
Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory.
Makowski, Piotr T.
core  

Rethinking responsibility: An Abhidharma Buddhist view

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 549-570, September 2025.
Abstract If reductionism about personal identity is true, “no one ever deserves to be punished for anything they did.” I call this the Responsible Agency Challenge. This paper addresses the question: How should we respond to this challenge? My response is inspired by the famous fifth century Buddhist Abhidharma philosopher, Vasubandhu, and the ...
Monima Chadha
wiley   +1 more source

Yksilöllinen ja sosiaalinen toimijuus Michael Bratmanin intentioiden suunnitteluteoriassa [PDF]

, 2018
Michael Bratmanin intentioiden suunnitteluteoria on herättänyt viimeisten vuosikymmenten aikana keskustelua laajasti aina teon filosofiasta tekoälytutkimukseen ja primatologiaan.
Haverinen, Miika
core  

The agentive achievement of acceptance

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 1, Page 3-24, July 2025.
Abstract Is acceptance an act or a state? Jonathan Cohen is often seen as a proponent of the view that acceptance is a mental act. In contrast, Michael Bratman claims that acceptance is a mental state. This paper argues that the evidence supports a more subtle approach.
Samuel Boardman
wiley   +1 more source

Love First

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 854-886, May 2025.
Abstract How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others' well‐being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all.
P. Quinn White
wiley   +1 more source

The do‐able solution to the interface problem

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 833-853, May 2025.
Abstract Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage
Yair Levy
wiley   +1 more source

The Normative Constitution of Agency [PDF]

, 2017
On a naturalistic conception of agency, someone is an agent when certain of his own mental states are the cause of his movements. On a normative conception, a person constitutes his agency by following certain principles or laws.
Korsgaard, Christine
core   +1 more source

Bratman on Intending

, 2017
This article is a response to Michael E. Bratman’s novel thought experiments in “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention” and so concerns instrumental rational planning agency.
Alberts, Joseph
core  

Intentions: Choice First, Commitment Follows

, 2002
Using a decision theoretic planner and bounded rationality reasoning, we reconsider the analysis of intentions proposed by Michael Bratman. Intentions are defined as predominant desires that can be achieved; but identifying which desire is the ...
Guido Boella, Boella, Guido
core   +1 more source

Morality, Friendship, and Collective Action

Journal of Social Ontology
This paper uses the tools of experimental philosophy to examine the nature of interpersonal normativity in collective action, focusing on cases of immoral collective action and collective action by friends.
Javier Gomez-Lavin, Matthew Rachar
doaj   +1 more source