Results 61 to 70 of about 5,300 (172)
The agentive achievement of acceptance
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 1, Page 3-24, July 2025.Abstract Is acceptance an act or a state? Jonathan Cohen is often seen as a proponent of the view that acceptance is a mental act. In contrast, Michael Bratman claims that acceptance is a mental state. This paper argues that the evidence supports a more subtle approach.
Samuel Boardman
wiley +1 more source
Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith
Journal of Social Ontology, 2014 These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
Michael E. Bratman
doaj
, 2018 Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit ...
Morton, Jennifer, Paul, Sarah
core
Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism [PDF]
, 2020 Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the
Clark, Philip
core
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 854-886, May 2025.Abstract How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others' well‐being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all.
P. Quinn White
wiley +1 more source
The do‐able solution to the interface problem
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 833-853, May 2025.Abstract Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage
Yair Levy
wiley +1 more source
, 2017 A book chapter (about 4,000 words, plus references) on decision theory in moral philosophy, with particular attention to uses of decision theory in specifying the contents of moral principles (e.g., expected-value forms of act and rule utilitarianism ...
Brink +12 more
core +1 more source
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention [PDF]
, 2020 The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some
Asarnow, Samuel
core
Pathways between people, wildlife and environmental justice in cities
People and Nature, Volume 7, Issue 3, Page 575-595, March 2025.Abstract Wildlife are increasingly recognized as critical to urban ecosystems, but the impacts and benefits of wildlife on people in cities are poorly understood. Environmental justice scholarship has concluded that elements of the urban environment can create or exacerbate social inequity, but human–wildlife interactions have not been considered ...
Alex McInturff +4 more
wiley +1 more source
, 2018 An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common ...
Lederman, Harvey
core