Results 11 to 20 of about 256 (167)
Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly [PDF]
In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader.
Aiyuan Tao, Yingjun Zhu, Xiangqing Zou
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Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly
Cooperatives, including those owned and run by workers (Workers Firms, WFs), compete with capitalist firms in oligopolistic industries (mixed oligopolies). We ra- tionalize several facts emerging from the empirical research as: the concern of WFs for their employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different ...
Flavio Delbono +2 more
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Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly [PDF]
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games.
Amir, Rabah, De Feo, Giuseppe
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Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition [PDF]
This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive price.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury +1 more
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The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies [PDF]
We extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved. We also investigate the case of public Stackelberg leadership and that of private Stackelberg leadership.
Bakó, Barna, Tasnádi, Attila
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Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms [PDF]
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they sets up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage ...
Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos +1 more
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Mixed duopoly with foreign firm and subcontracting [PDF]
We consider a Hotelling model, in which a public firm competes with a foreign firm, at the mean time cooperates with it through subcontracting. We find that when there exists subcontracting, the presence of a foreign firm raises social welfare. Comparing to competing with the domestic private firm, when the public firm competing with the foreign firm ...
Lyu, Yuanzhen, Shuai, Jie
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Stackelberg Equilibrium in a Mixed Duopoly [PDF]
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong.
Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. +2 more
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The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms [PDF]
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
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This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows.
KAZUHIRO OHNISHI
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