Results 11 to 20 of about 256 (167)

Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Applied Mathematics, 2013
In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader.
Aiyuan Tao, Yingjun Zhu, Xiangqing Zou
doaj   +5 more sources

Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly

open access: yesEconomic Modelling, 2023
Cooperatives, including those owned and run by workers (Workers Firms, WFs), compete with capitalist firms in oligopolistic industries (mixed oligopolies). We ra- tionalize several facts emerging from the empirical research as: the concern of WFs for their employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different ...
Flavio Delbono   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2013
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games.
Amir, Rabah, De Feo, Giuseppe
openaire   +9 more sources

Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition [PDF]

open access: yesArthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2011
This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive price.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2017
We extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved. We also investigate the case of public Stackelberg leadership and that of private Stackelberg leadership.
Bakó, Barna, Tasnádi, Attila
openaire   +3 more sources

Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Economics, 2003
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they sets up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage ...
Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Mixed duopoly with foreign firm and subcontracting [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Review of Economics & Finance, 2013
We consider a Hotelling model, in which a public firm competes with a foreign firm, at the mean time cooperates with it through subcontracting. We find that when there exists subcontracting, the presence of a foreign firm raises social welfare. Comparing to competing with the domestic private firm, when the public firm competing with the foreign firm ...
Lyu, Yuanzhen, Shuai, Jie
openaire   +2 more sources

Stackelberg Equilibrium in a Mixed Duopoly [PDF]

open access: yesSecond International Conference on Innovative Computing, Informatio and Control (ICICIC 2007), 2007
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong.
Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2020
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
doaj  

WAGE-RISE CONTRACT AND MIXED COURNOT DUOPOLY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT-MAXIMIZING AND SOCIALLY CONCERNED FIRMS

open access: yesJournal of Business & Economic Analysis, 2022
This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows.
KAZUHIRO OHNISHI
doaj   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy