Results 11 to 20 of about 19,557 (284)

A new argument for moral error theory

open access: yesNoûs, 2020
AbstractTraditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.
Christopher Cowie, Cowie, Christopher
openaire   +5 more sources

Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2017
In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything.
Richard Rowland   +2 more
openaire   +5 more sources

Richard Joyce’s Argument by Elimination for Moral Error Theory

open access: yesInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Abstract In Morality: From Error to Fiction , Richard Joyce argues that ordinary moral discourse is committed to the existence of ontologically robust moral facts, on the basis that ordinary speakers consider moral belief to be a sincerity condition of moral judgement.
Sinclair, Neil
openaire   +3 more sources

Overconsumption, Procreation, and Morality

open access: yesEthics in Progress, 2014
Thomas Young (2001) argues that overconsumption and procreation are morally equivalent, and thus that anyone who disapproves of overconsumption must arrive at the same normative judgment concerning procreation (or procreation beyond a certain threshold).
John Mariana
doaj   +3 more sources

If You Can Understand This Essay, Then You Have Moral Rights and Moral Duties

open access: yesOpen Philosophy, 2020
Alan Gewirth’s work on moral and political philosophy attracted a great deal of attention between 1978 and 2000, but has received very little attention since then.
White Alan
doaj   +1 more source

Just War contra Drone Warfare

open access: yesConatus - Journal of Philosophy, 2023
In this article, I present a two-pronged argument for the immorality of contemporary, asymmetric drone warfare, based on my new interpretations of the just war principles of “proportionality” and “moral equivalence of combatants” (MEC).
Joshua M. Hall
doaj   +1 more source

The false promise of the better argument [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
Effective argumentation in international politics is widely conceived as a matter of persuasion. In particular, the ‘logic of arguing’ ascribes explanatory power to the ‘better argument’ and promises to illuminate the conditions of legitimate ...
Tine Hanrieder, Hanrieder, Tine
core   +1 more source

Naturalistic Moral Realism and Evolutionary Biology

open access: yesPhilosophies, 2021
Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understanding it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method.
Paul Bloomfield
doaj   +1 more source

The problem of moral luck: An argument against its epistemic reduction [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
Whom I call 'epistemic reductionists' in this article are critics of the notion of 'moral luck' that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only ...
A. Schinkel   +4 more
core   +1 more source

Is calibration a fairness requirement?

open access: yes2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency, 2022
In this paper, we provide a moral analysis of two criteria of statistical fairness debated in the machine learning literature: 1) calibration between groups and 2) equality of false positive and false negative rates between groups. In our paper, we focus on moral arguments in support of either measure. The conflict between group calibration vs.
Michele Loi, Christoph Heitz
openaire   +2 more sources

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