Results 31 to 40 of about 1,348,779 (245)
Moral Hazard and Ambiguity [PDF]
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures.
openaire +4 more sources
Altruism, moral hazard, and sharecropping
The paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of sharecropping in agriculture. Under the principal-agent moral hazard framework, the choice of the agrarian land lease contracts is discussed from the perspective of behavioural economics.
Jiancai PI
doaj +1 more source
Is There Moral Hazard in Islamic Rural Bank Financing?
The credit market was identical to asymmetric information in it, both conventional and sharia credit markets. One of the forms of this asymmetric information was moral hazard.
Adelia Oktarina+2 more
doaj +1 more source
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring [PDF]
1This paper incorporates earlier work by Bhaskar [4] and unpublished notes by van Damme. We are grateful to Tilman Börgers, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments. The first author thanks the CentER for Economic Research (Tilburg) for its hospitality while some of this
Bhaskar, V., Damme, E.E.C. van
openaire +9 more sources
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts [PDF]
Abstract We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efficient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades (third best inefficiency).
Arnold Chassagnon+2 more
openaire +10 more sources
Effective method of bilateral matching decision-making could drive the property transaction market more dynamic and healthier. In the property trade process, once intermediaries are conscientious, the portrait of matching parties are clearly described ...
Rui Wang, Wenjin Zuo
doaj +1 more source
Optimism, overconfidence, and moral hazard [PDF]
I revisit the standard moral-hazard model, in which an agent's preference over contracts is rooted in costly effort choice. I characterise the behavioural content of the model in terms of empirically testable axioms, and show that the model's parameters are identified. I propose general behavioural definitions of relative (over)confidence and optimism,
arxiv
Platform Tokenization: Financing, Governance, and Moral Hazard
This paper highlights two channels through which blockchain-enabled tokenization can alleviate moral hazard frictions between founders, investors, and users of a platform: token financing and decentralized governance. We consider an entrepreneur who uses
J. Chod, Nikolaos Trichakis, S. A. Yang
semanticscholar +1 more source
Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Uber and Taxis
Digital platforms provide a variety of technology-enabled tools that enhance market transparency, such as real-time monitoring, ratings of buyers and sellers, and low-cost complaint channels.
Meng Liu+2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard [PDF]
ABSTRACTWhat determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors.
Chemla, Gilles, Hennessy, Christopher A.
openaire +6 more sources