Results 281 to 290 of about 1,628,309 (322)
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2012
AbstractThe past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or ...
Michael R. Waldmann +2 more
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AbstractThe past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or ...
Michael R. Waldmann +2 more
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Measuring Nurses' Moral Judgments
Image: the Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 1990Studies of the moral reasoning of nurses yield inconsistent findings. Using Cronbach and Meehl's interpretive framework, the author demonstrates the lack of construct validity for Kohlberg's theory of moral development and related measures of moral reasoning.
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The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Psychology Review, 2001J. Haidt
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An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Science, 2001S. Bixler +14 more
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1998
Abstract As shown in the first chapter, all previous accounts of moral judgments are inadequate because they provide no clear distinction between moral and nonmoral judgments. These linguistic or metaethical accounts are unable to provide a clear distinction because they are primarily theories about the purposes of making moral judgments,
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Abstract As shown in the first chapter, all previous accounts of moral judgments are inadequate because they provide no clear distinction between moral and nonmoral judgments. These linguistic or metaethical accounts are unable to provide a clear distinction because they are primarily theories about the purposes of making moral judgments,
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Moral realism and moral judgments
Erkenntnis, 1992For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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Moral instinct and moral judgment
Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2009Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions.
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