Results 211 to 220 of about 7,117 (260)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
The Philosophical Review, 1995
Abstract There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over ...
Marcia Baron, Michael Slote
openaire +2 more sources
Abstract There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over ...
Marcia Baron, Michael Slote
openaire +2 more sources
MORAL VIRTUE AND REASONS FOR ACTION
Philosophical Issues, 2009Moral virtue is a central notion in ethics, and understanding it is a challenge for action theory and moral psychology. It is no easy task to provide an account of it, but even a plausible account of what moral virtue is leaves largely open the difficult question of what it is to act virtuously and the related question of how we can ensure that we do ...
openaire +2 more sources
2018
When we use virtue-terms to make moral evaluations of persons, attitudes, and actions, we are evaluating the quality of their responsiveness to the reasons morality gives us. A convincing vindication of that claim needs to provide a detailed account of which virtues respond to which reasons.
openaire +1 more source
When we use virtue-terms to make moral evaluations of persons, attitudes, and actions, we are evaluating the quality of their responsiveness to the reasons morality gives us. A convincing vindication of that claim needs to provide a detailed account of which virtues respond to which reasons.
openaire +1 more source
ARE THERE “CONTRA‐MORAL VIRTUES”?*
Metaphilosophy, 1994L'A. retrouve le sens aristotelicien d'«excellence» pour le terme de vertu en se demandant si, comme l'affirme Slote, il existe des vertus immorales. A travers l'exemple de Gauguin qui a «failli a ses devoirs familiaux» pour partir vivre sa passion, l'A.
openaire +1 more source
2020
Aristotle is not a reductionist with respect to the explanation of human behavior. You are a substance; your form is your soul. A certain mental event is to a certain physical event as form is to matter, and accordingly admits of both physiological and psychological descriptions and explanations.
openaire +1 more source
Aristotle is not a reductionist with respect to the explanation of human behavior. You are a substance; your form is your soul. A certain mental event is to a certain physical event as form is to matter, and accordingly admits of both physiological and psychological descriptions and explanations.
openaire +1 more source
Hume?s Virtues and Moral Psychology
2012In this paper I claim that Hume’s virtue ethics, in line with the classical conceptions, identifies a necessary psychological characteristic for the possession of the virtues: these psychological states are the moral sentiments.
openaire +2 more sources
2014
The scope of interest and reflection on virtue and the virtues is as wide and deep as the questions we can ask about what makes a moral agent’s life decent, or noble, or holy rather than cruel, or base, or sinful; or about the conditions of human character and circumstance that make for good relations between family members, friends, workers,
openaire +1 more source
The scope of interest and reflection on virtue and the virtues is as wide and deep as the questions we can ask about what makes a moral agent’s life decent, or noble, or holy rather than cruel, or base, or sinful; or about the conditions of human character and circumstance that make for good relations between family members, friends, workers,
openaire +1 more source
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2001
I argue that curiosity about the world deserves attention as a moral virtue, even apart from the role it may play in (the more generally praised) love of wisdom. First, close relationships and caring are reasonably considered part of a well-lived life, and curiosity is important for caring both about people and about things in the world.
openaire +1 more source
I argue that curiosity about the world deserves attention as a moral virtue, even apart from the role it may play in (the more generally praised) love of wisdom. First, close relationships and caring are reasonably considered part of a well-lived life, and curiosity is important for caring both about people and about things in the world.
openaire +1 more source
Morality, Virtues and Categories
1987Morality, then, is about the state of the soul; or, if ‘soul’ is too unfashionable a word, about our basic emotional dispositions and mental health. A number of things follow from this, some of which we need not linger over. First, there will be whole areas of human life which some might not normally put under that heading, but which certainly ought to
openaire +1 more source