Results 71 to 80 of about 19,771 (142)

Entry Selection [PDF]

open access: yes
It is well-known in the IO literature that incumbent firms may want to deter entry by behaving as if they are efficient. In this paper we show that incumbents may sometimes prefer to encourage entry by mimicking the behaviour of a less efficient firm for
B. Westbrock   +2 more
core  

Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism [PDF]

open access: yes
We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively.
Celik, Gorkem, Peters, Michael
core  

Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates [PDF]

open access: yes
Which issues are discussed by candidates in an election campaign? Why are some issues never discussed? Model tractability is lost quickly when dealing with these questions, partly because of the multidimensional voting inherent in models of multiple ...
Hideo Konishi, Marcus Berliant
core  

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