Results 191 to 200 of about 48,385 (220)
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The Review of Economic Studies, 1996
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Krishna, Vijay, Serrano, Roberto
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Krishna, Vijay, Serrano, Roberto
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Multilateral bargaining with proposer selection contest
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2022AbstractThis study investigates the competition to be selected as the proposer in a subsequent multilateral bargaining game experimentally. The experimental environment varies in two dimensions: reservation payoffs (homogeneous or heterogeneous) and information on the extent of each subject's investment in the competition (public or private).
Duk Gyoo Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim
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Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Baliga, Sandeep, Serrano, Roberto
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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining
Annual Review of Economics, 2019This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic
Hülya Eraslan, Kirill S. Evdokimov
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Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2014
I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation.
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I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation.
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Uniqueness in Random-Proposer Multilateral Bargaining
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function?
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Multilateral Bargaining for Resource Division
2014We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation.
Fatima Shaheen, Wooldridge Michael
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Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure
Economics Letters, 2021zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gao, Hong, Xu, Haibo
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A multilateral telephone bargaining game
Economics Letters, 2010zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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