Results 211 to 220 of about 209,590 (243)
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Uniqueness in Random-Proposer Multilateral Bargaining

International Game Theory Review, 2008
Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function?
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Institutions and Information in Multilateral Bargaining Experiments

B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2013
Abstract This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (
Robert Shupp   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure

Economics Letters, 2021
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gao, Hong, Xu, Haibo
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Multilateral War Bargaining

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2014
I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation.
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Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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The Determinants of Voting in Multilateral Bargaining Games

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2017
Abstract Models of multilateral bargaining predict that agents would vote solely based on the share they are offered and that their vote is determined by whether that share is at least as high as the continuation value (CV) of the game.
Guillaume R. Frechette, Emanuel Vespa
exaly   +2 more sources

Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

Journal of Economic Theory, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

Theory and Decision, 1996
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015
We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria ...
Attila Ambrus, Shih En Lu
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Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment

Journal of Econometrics, 2009
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