Results 191 to 200 of about 1,709 (231)
The place of health in the EU-CELAC interregional cooperation from 2005 to 2023: a historical, empirical and prospective analysis. [PDF]
Salgado C.
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Assessing Law No. 87 of 2024 on private sector management of public healthcare facilities in Egypt: neoliberal roots, potential consequences, and policy recommendations. [PDF]
Abu El Kheir-Mataria W +2 more
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Review of Economic Studies, 1996
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Roberto Serrano
exaly +2 more sources
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Roberto Serrano
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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining
Annual Review of Economics, 2019This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic
Hulya Eraslan, Kirill S Evdokimov
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Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Antonio Penta
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Institutions and information in multilateral bargaining experiments
B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2013Abstract This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (
Robert Shupp, Kurtis J Swope
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The determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2017AbstractModels of multilateral bargaining predict that agents would vote solely based on the share they are offered and that their vote is determined by whether that share is at least as high as the continuation value (CV) of the game. The standard experiment investigating behavior in multilateral bargaining is not well designed to determine if that is
Guillaume R Fréchette +2 more
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Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Baliga, Sandeep, Serrano, Roberto
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Multilateral Bargaining for Resource Division
2014We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation.
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael J. Wooldridge
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