Results 41 to 50 of about 7,321 (135)
ABSTRACT This article studies a network interdiction problem where the success of the first player's attempt to remove arcs is based on decision‐dependent success probabilities, and the second player (the follower) responds by pushing maximum flow. In this multi‐stage model, previous interdictions affect future interdictions' success probabilities. The
Baris Tezcan, Kayse Lee Maass
wiley +1 more source
ABSTRACT This study reports the results of a systematic literature review on auctions mechanism. Auctions are a very popular practice employed in many fields but does not exist a research that investigates the use of auctions under a cross‐disciplinary approach. This work is focused on analyzing which are the areas where auctions are mostly adopted and
Alberto Michele Felicetti +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Correlated equilibria and communication in games. [PDF]
Analyse bayésienne; Théorie des jeux; Information privée;
Forges, Françoise
core
Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations [PDF]
Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue.
Terstiege, Stefan
core +2 more sources
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games [PDF]
Not Available At This ...
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
core
Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority [PDF]
We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members.
Agranov, Marina +2 more
core
Criterion-referenced and norm-referenced agreement between the mile run/walk test and the one-and-a-half mile run/walk test and the pacer test [PDF]
Purpose – The purpose of this study was to test the reliability of the Mile Run/Walk Test and One-and-a-Half Mile Run or Walk Test,and the PACER Test 20-m, multistage shuttle run using criterion reference and norm reference as a working framework. Method
Hashim, Ahmad, Madon, Mohd Sani
core
Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames [PDF]
Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1994.Game Theory;
Selten, Reinhard
core
Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case [PDF]
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players
Francoise Forges, Péter Vida
core
Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory. [PDF]
game theory; Bayesian games;
Forges, Françoise
core

