Results 91 to 100 of about 4,823 (195)

Continuum Nash bargaining solutions

open access: yesNonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEA
Abstract We compute a mean field limit of Nash bargaining solutions with agents chosen from a smooth probability density and with utility determined by the negative exponential of a cost function. When the cost function has the property that Kantorovich potentials are unique, we show that both at finite stages and
openaire   +3 more sources

The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate [PDF]

open access: yes
We compare the Nash bargaining solution in a reinsurance syndicate to the competitive equilibrium allocation, focusing on uncertainty and risk aversion.
Aase, Knut K.
core  

Distributed robust optimization strategy for multi-energy virtual power plant clusters

open access: yesScientific Reports
As renewable energy penetration continues to rise, the demand for coordinated optimization of decentralized source-load-storage. Virtual power plant (VPP) addresses this need by aggregating and coordinating diverse resources.
Ziyang Wang   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Nash Bargaining Approach for Fair and Efficient LTE–WiFi Aggregation

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2019
As the demand for mobile traffic is growing, radio frequency bandwidths often become insufficient for guaranteeing specific performance. Utilizing unlicensed 5 GHz broadband bandwidths, the LWA system enables the synergistic use of LTE and WiFi systems ...
Dohoon Kim, Keunhee Lee, Jae-Hoon Kim
doaj   +1 more source

The Effect of Food Value Chain Interventions on Food Security in Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Systematic Review and Meta‐Analysis

open access: yesFood Science &Nutrition, Volume 14, Issue 6, June 2026.
Household participation in food value chain interventions in sub‐Saharan Africa was associated with 16‐percentage‐point lower food insecurity prevalence, higher dietary diversity, 506 kcal greater daily energy intake, USD 42 higher annual food expenditure per person, and improved child weight‐for‐age. Producer‐level benefits included USD 45 higher farm
Andre M. N. Renzaho   +5 more
wiley   +1 more source

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

open access: yesJournal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016
In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
doaj   +1 more source

Strategic Delay and Bargaining Over Public Insurance Coverage for Drugs in Australia

open access: yesHealth Economics, Volume 35, Issue 6, Page 1005-1018, June 2026.
ABSTRACT Public funding for pharmaceuticals often follows repeated negotiation between manufacturers and a public agency, yet little empirical work examines how the timing of agreement reflects the economic structure of these interactions. Using a duration model of negotiations in Australia from 2005 to 2018, we assess whether observed patterns of ...
Jing Jing Li, Anthony Harris
wiley   +1 more source

Multilateral Non-Cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space [PDF]

open access: yes
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such ...
Hannu Vartiainen, Klaus Kultti
core  

A Hydrogen Energy Storage Configuration Method for Enhancing the Resilience of Distribution Networks Within Integrated Energy Systems

open access: yesEnergies
To address the challenges of renewable energy curtailment under normal conditions and severe power outages under extreme scenarios, this paper proposes a hydrogen-integrated comprehensive energy system (H-IES) configuration method aimed at enhancing the ...
Song Zhang   +5 more
doaj   +1 more source

Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 402-419, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley   +1 more source

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