Results 131 to 140 of about 234,236 (303)

Generating Bayes-Nash equilibria to design autonomous trading agents.

, 2007
This paper presents a methodology for designing trading agents for complex games. We compute, for the first time, Bayes-Nash equilibria for firstprice single-unit auctions and mth-price multi-unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing ...
Jennings, N. R., Vetsikas, I., Selman, B.   +2 more
core   +1 more source

An evolutionary differential game for regulating the role of monoclonal antibodies in treating signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer

Royal Society Open Science
This work presents a new framework for a competitive evolutionary game between monoclonal antibodies and signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer. The framework is based on a novel dynamical model that takes into account the dynamic progression of ...
Mesfer Alajmi, Souvik Roy
doaj   +1 more source

Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games [PDF]

. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria correspond to diagonal saddle points of ...
Flåm, Sjur Didrik, Ruszczynski, A.
core  

Collusion through debt and managers

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.
Abstract We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy ...
Raffaele Fiocco, Salvatore Piccolo, Giancarlo Spagnolo   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

A Numerical Algorithm to find Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria in Scalar LQ-Games [PDF]

In this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game.The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix.The analysis follows
Engwerda, J.C.
core  

Spite in litigation

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper studies how litigation and settlement behaviour is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American fee‐shifting rule compared to the English one. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures are overall higher under the English rule compared to the American rule—even for low‐merit cases ...
Wladislaw Mill, Jonathan Stäbler
wiley   +1 more source

Slightly Altruistic Equilibria in Normal Form Games [PDF]

We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003).
Jacqueline Morgan, Giuseppe De Marco
core  

Incentives and motivational crowding to address chronic wasting disease: An experiment with Alberta hunters

Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, EarlyView.
Abstract Behavioral interventions, for example, through the use of incentives and information, are widely used by policymakers to induce welfare‐improving behavior. When these interventions are used in specific contexts such as environmental conservation, individual knowledge, experience, and attitudes can lead to motivational crowding and may limit ...
Lusi Xie, Maik Kecinski, Wiktor Adamowicz   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games [PDF]

We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in the load balancing games of m (m >= 2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of the server it chooses.
Zhang, Yu-Zhong, Li, Song-Song, Chen, Bo
core  

The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition

Contemporary Economic Policy, EarlyView.
Abstract We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor‐market power interacts with product‐market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variables are strategic ...
Noriaki Matsushima, Kazuki Nishikawa, Jiaying Qiu   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source