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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1995Summary: Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an \(n\)-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe -- about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player ...
Aumann, Robert, Brandenburger, Adam
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Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1982
In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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2020
Here a definition of the Nash equilibrium is presented, regarded as the most prominent solution concept for non-cooperative games. Information requirements such as common knowledge of rationality (CKR) and consistent-aligned beliefs (CAB) are discussed.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Here a definition of the Nash equilibrium is presented, regarded as the most prominent solution concept for non-cooperative games. Information requirements such as common knowledge of rationality (CKR) and consistent-aligned beliefs (CAB) are discussed.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1992Summary: Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. We show that it is possible to act rationally provided we limit our attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2009
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Computational Mathematics and Modeling, 2000
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