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Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Multiagent Games Under Switching Communication Topologies
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 2018This paper investigates distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in multiagent games under switching communication topologies. To be specific, the communication topology is supposed to be switching among a set of strongly connected digraphs, which might ...
Maojiao Ye, G. Hu
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SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2019
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) are a generalization of the classic Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs), where each player's strategy set depends on the choices of the other players.
L. F. Bueno, G. Haeser, F. N. Rojas
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Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) are a generalization of the classic Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs), where each player's strategy set depends on the choices of the other players.
L. F. Bueno, G. Haeser, F. N. Rojas
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This is a unique account of the role played by 58 figures and diagrams commonly used in economic theory. These cover a large part of mainstream economic analysis, both microeconomics and macroeconomics and also general equilibrium theory.
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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1995Summary: Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an \(n\)-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe -- about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player ...
Aumann, Robert, Brandenburger, Adam
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Accelerated Gradient Play Algorithm for Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2018We study distributed algorithms for seeking a Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative games with strongly monotone mappings. Each player has access to her own smooth local cost function and can communicate to her neighbors in some undirected graph.
T. Tatarenko, Wei Shi, A. Nedić
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Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1982
In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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2020
Here a definition of the Nash equilibrium is presented, regarded as the most prominent solution concept for non-cooperative games. Information requirements such as common knowledge of rationality (CKR) and consistent-aligned beliefs (CAB) are discussed.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Here a definition of the Nash equilibrium is presented, regarded as the most prominent solution concept for non-cooperative games. Information requirements such as common knowledge of rationality (CKR) and consistent-aligned beliefs (CAB) are discussed.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1992Summary: Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. We show that it is possible to act rationally provided we limit our attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2009
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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