Results 71 to 80 of about 1,067,568 (299)
Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium [PDF]
We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than thestandard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Indeed, we simultaneously replace commonknowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with ...
Tsakas Elias, Bach Christian W.
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Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. [PDF]
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int.
Topuzu, Mihaela +1 more
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Med Research, EarlyView.This review systematically compares the size‐dependent toxicity of microplastics and nanoplastics in the intestine, liver, kidney, lung, and brain. Particle size determines bioavailability, barrier penetration, and injury mechanisms. Because of their small size and high surface reactivity, NPs readily cross the intestinal epithelium and blood–brain ...
Yixian Cheng +14 more
wiley +1 more source
Constrained Weak Nash-Type Equilibrium Problems
Abstract and Applied Analysis, 2014 A constrained weak Nash-type equilibrium problem with multivalued payoff functions is introduced. By virtue of a nonlinear scalarization function, some existence results are established. The results extend the corresponding one of Fu (2003).
W. C. Shuai, K. L. Xiang, W. Y. Zhang
doaj +1 more source
Geometrical regret matching: A new dynamics to Nash equilibrium
AIP Advances, 2020 We argue that the existing regret matchings for Nash equilibrium approximation conduct “jumpy” strategy updating when the probabilities of future plays are set to be proportional to positive regret measures.
Sizhong Lan
doaj +1 more source
Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games [PDF]
This paper shows that the set of probability distributions over networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed by Myerson (1991) is finite for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks.
Carlos Pimienta
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Tactical and Strategic Risks From Supply Disruptions in Competing Supply Chains
Naval Research Logistics (NRL), EarlyView.ABSTRACT Supply chain disruptions can lead to both tactical (i.e., loss of short‐term sales during a disruption) and strategic (i.e., loss of long‐term market share) consequences. We model the impact of a supply disruption on competing supply chains in which two firms compete for a limited backup supply.
Akhil Singla +3 more
wiley +1 more source
, 2010 This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model. Some source problems which motivate the model are discussed. Monte Carlo sampling method is applied to solve the SEPEC. Convergence analysis on the
Xu, Huifu, Zhang, Dali
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Quantum gambling based on Nash-equilibrium
npj Quantum Information, 2017 Quantum information: Quantum gambling based on Nash-equilibrium Gambling or betting on an event with an uncertain outcome, is one of the most widely practiced activities in human society.
Pei Zhang +8 more
doaj +1 more source
The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation [PDF]
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.
Rosinger, Elemer Elad
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