Results 81 to 90 of about 32,632 (304)

Non-zero sum differential games of anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equations under partial information and application

open access: yesAdvances in Difference Equations, 2017
This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information.
Yi Zhuang
doaj   +1 more source

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium [PDF]

open access: yes
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility ...
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
core  

Unravelling Evolutionary Dynamics of Female Sexual Cannibalism and Male Reproductive Strategies in Spiders

open access: yesIntegrative Zoology, EarlyView.
Sexual cannibalism (SC), where one mating partner consumes the other in the context of mating, is especially prevalent among spiders. However, the evolution of SC in spiders is still not fully understood. We review key hypotheses for SC and explore how female‐initiated SC has driven the evolution of various male counter‐adaptations to mitigate its ...
Simona Kralj‐Fišer   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. [PDF]

open access: yes
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int.
Topuzu, Mihaela   +1 more
core  

Network Structure and the Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Evidence from U.S. Freight Railroads

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The trade‐off between market power and efficiency gains is central to antitrust analyses of mergers, but empirical evidence quantifying efficiencies remains limited. Using transaction‐level data from U.S. freight railroads (1985–2005), this article quantifies merger‐induced cost efficiencies, driven mainly by eliminating inter‐railroad ...
Yanyou Chen
wiley   +1 more source

Preemptive Entry and Technology Diffusion: The Market for Drive‐In Theaters

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This article studies entry preemption in new industries. We first test a key prediction of dynamic entry games: Entry preemption is most relevant in intermediate‐sized markets, where firms face highest uncertainty about future entry. Using US drive‐in theater market (1945–1957) data, we find robust evidence for this non‐monotonic relationship ...
Ricard Gil   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Mergers in the Presence of Adverse Selection

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare through a reduction in inefficient sorting. I characterize the sorting externality internalized between merging firms in a tractable discrete choice model. Mergers benefit consumers when the firms are small, willingness to pay is moderately increasing in cost, and consumer ...
Conor Ryan
wiley   +1 more source

Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley   +1 more source

THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM [PDF]

open access: yes
I consider a strategic game form with a finite set of payoff states and employ undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) as a solution concept under complete information. I propose notions of the proximity of information according to which the continuity of UNE
Takashi Kunimoto
core  

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