Results 1 to 10 of about 282,399 (295)
Local public good provisioning in networks: A Nash implementation mechanism [PDF]
In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that either affects or is affected by it ...
Shrutivandana Sharma+1 more
arxiv +5 more sources
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results [PDF]
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the
Lombardi, Michele, Yoshihara, Naoki
core +5 more sources
Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet [PDF]
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable ...
Haoyang Wu
arxiv +5 more sources
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market [PDF]
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash equilibrium when both sides of the market play strategically.
Noelia Juárez+2 more
arxiv +3 more sources
Pareto Efficient Nash Implementation Via Approval Voting [PDF]
We study implementation of a social choice correspondence in the case of two players who have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives, and the mechanism is allowed to output lotteries. Our main positive result shows that a close variant of the popular approval voting mechanism succeeds in selecting only Pareto ...
Yakov Babichenko, Leonard J. Schulman
arxiv +3 more sources
Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria [PDF]
We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f ...
Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama
core +7 more sources
Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: Convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games [PDF]
In this paper we present the extraproximal method for computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria in a class of ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games.
Trejo Kristal K.+2 more
doaj +2 more sources
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium [PDF]
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Mezzetti, Claudio, Renou, Ludovic
core +5 more sources
Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result [PDF]
[J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two important papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Recently, [H.
Wu, Haoyang
core +4 more sources
In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
doaj +2 more sources